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The Business Of Treaties
Melissa J. Durkee
ABsTrAcT
Business entities play important and underappreciated roles in the production of 
international treaties.  At the same time, international treaty law is hobbled by state-
centric presumptions that render its response to business ad hoc and unprincipled.  
This Article makes three principal contributions.  First, it draws from case studies 
to demonstrate the significance of business participation in treaty production.  The 
descriptive account invites a shift from attention to traditional lobbying at the domestic 
level and private standard-setting at the transnational level to the ways business entities 
have become autonomous international actors, using a panoply of means to transform 
their preferred policies into law.  Second, the Article analyzes the significance of these 
descriptive facts, identifying an important set of questions raised by business roles in 
treaty production.  Specifically, business participation could affect the success or failure 
of treaties along a number of different axes that this Article identifies: participation, 
process, substance, and compliance.  Third, observing that scholars and lawmakers could 
seize an opportunity to design a theoretically principled legal response to business roles 
in treaty production, the Article identifies both potential legal structures and reasons why 
law in this arena could be beneficial.  Among other reasons, law could facilitate treaty 
effectiveness along the dimensions this Article identifies; enhance treaty legitimacy by 
ensuring that decisionmakers are accountable to the relevant stakeholders; and foster 
rule of law values such as certainty and procedural stability, which could aid public and 
private participants alike.  
Ultimately, the facts the Article describes present a choice: International law can respond 
in real time to business roles in treaty production, or it can let those roles evolve as they 
will, with uncertain and possibly enduring results.
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INTRODUCTION 
At press time, international negotiators have just agreed to the Trans Pacific 
Partnership, a major trade treaty, in a process said to be heavily influenced by 
backroom deals with massive multinational corporations.1  These corporate treaty 
influencers are industry giants in agriculture, pharmaceuticals, and tobacco,2 and 
so activists and members of Congress alike have sounded alarms: Will corporate 
interests displace important public goods?3   
Although business participation in the TPP negotiation process has drawn 
popular disquiet, this business role in treaty production is not unique.  For exam-
ple, business entities have become deeply involved in designing, negotiating, and 
implementing a number of treaties in the private law arena.  These treaties keep 
cargo ships plying their trade and airplanes in the air.4  And, for these treaties, 
business expertise can appear to be indispensable to a treaty’s success.5  As these 
examples suggest, and as this Article will describe, business entities play im-
portant roles in the making of international treaties.6  However, the mechanisms, 
  
1. See, e.g., 158 CONG. REC. S3517 (daily ed. May 23, 2012) (statement of Sen. Wyden) (“[T]he 
majority of Congress is being kept in the dark as to the substance of the [Trans-Pacific Partnership] 
negotiations, while representatives of U.S. corporations—like Halliburton, Chevron, PHRMA, 
Comcast, and the Motion Picture Association of America—are being consulted and made privy to 
details of the agreement.”); Taylor Wofford, What Is the Trans-Pacific Partnership and Why Are Critics 
Upset by It?, NEWSWEEK (Jun. 12, 2015, 1:12 PM),  http://www.newsweek.com/what-tpp-trade-
deal-342449 (“[D]rafts of the agreement [are] under lock and key, although some 700 ‘cleared 
advisers,’ most of them corporate lobbyists, have been able to read it and make suggestions.  This, 
naturally, has led to speculation from a variety of sources about what’s actually in the TPP”). 
2. See 158 Cong. Rec. S3517, supra note 1. 
3. See, e.g., Peter K. Yu, TPP and Trans-Pacific Perplexities, 37 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1129, 1174 
(2014) (examining the intellectual property activism provoked by the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and 
surveying concerns such as transparency, accountability, and democratic participation); Wofford, 
supra note 1 (noting the concerns of Internet privacy rights advocates, labor unions and envi-
ronmentalists).  
4. See infra Part II (discussing business’s role in development of the Convention on International 
Interests in Mobile Equipment, Nov. 16, 2001, 2307 U.N.T.S. 285, and G.A. Res. 63/122, United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea 
(Dec. 11, 2008)). 
5. See, e.g., Roy Goode, From Acorn to Oak Tree: The Development of the Cape Town Convention and 
Protocols, 17 UNIF. L. REV. 599, 606 (2012) (noting that a business working group mounted a 
substantial campaign that proved indispensable to the development of the Cape Town Convention); 
see also infra Part II.A. 
6. This Article uses the terms “business,” “business actors,” “business entities,” “market actors,” and 
“industry actors” interchangeably.  These are meant as umbrella terms that refer broadly to entities 
that exist for the purpose of generating a profit for owners or shareholders. 
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extent, and effects of business participation are largely understudied and un-
derappreciated.   
What are these business roles, and what effect do they have on the success or 
failure of international treaties?  The question is both significant and ripe for ex-
amination.  It is significant, at least in part, because the health of international 
treaties is imperiled.  Critics charge that the treaty process is too slow, unwieldy, 
and contentious to adequately govern deeply perplexing global problems, like cli-
mate change, and important emerging ones, like cybersecurity.7  Yet treaties are al-
so indispensable.8  In order to achieve better solutions to pressing global problems, 
legal doctrine and scholarship must address defects in treaty law.  As this Article 
proposes, one important potential defect is treaty law’s inability to respond to the 
deep embeddedness of business entities in the process of treaty production. 
The failure, I argue, arises in part from outdated theory.  Leading interna-
tional legal theory begins with the premise that states are the principal actors on 
the international stage, and that state officials are the relevant lawmakers.9  Non-
state actors—like businesses—affect international lawmaking by participating in 
domestic political systems.10  By implication, domestic laws structuring business 
participation in lawmaking should be sufficient to regulate at the international 
level as well.  As this Article shows through case studies, however, businesses no 
  
7. See, e.g., Sungjoon Cho & Claire R. Kelly, Promises and Perils of New Global Governance: A Case of the 
G20, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 491, 497 nn.13–14 (collecting literature on multilateral treaty failures); 
Kristen E. Eichensehr, The Cyber-Law of Nations, 103 GEO. L.J. 317, 354–60 (2015) (evaluating 
and dismissing the international treaty as an appropriate form of cyberspace governance); Jonathan 
Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 
677, 740–41 (1999) (exploring limitations of the treaty as a means of responding to climate change). 
8. See Melissa J. Durkee, Persuasion Treaties, 99 VA. L. REV. 63, 75–77 (2013) (collecting literature that 
explains why treaties are necessary to structure international organizations, courts, and governance 
regimes, confer legitimacy, coordinate regulation, and prevent regulatory “leakage”). 
9. See L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 341 (1905) (footnote omitted) (“Since 
the Law of Nations is a law between States only and exclusively, States only and exclusively are 
subjects of the Law of Nations.”); Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated 
Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 470–83 (2005) (surveying core theoretical 
assumptions of international legal theory including the primacy of the state); Developments in the 
Law—Extraterritoriality, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1226, 1228 (2011) (tracing this principle to the 
Treaty of Westphalia in 1648); see also JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 3–4 (2005) (using a rational choice model to provide an account of why 
states develop international law). 
10. This is a major contribution of liberal theory—the first international legal theory to “open[] the black 
box of the state” and consider the role of substate actors.  Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights 
Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1961 (2002); see also Andrew Moravcsik, Taking 
Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics, 51 INT’L ORG. 513, 513 (1997) 
(elaborating liberal theory in international relations; explaining that domestic constituencies 
construct state interests). 
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longer simply exert domestic leverage.11  Instead, they form transnational co-
alitions, address their concerns directly to international lawmakers who are 
not subject to domestic political checks, and assume lawmaking roles previ-
ously held only by states.12 
Yet international treaty law maintains obsolete, state-centric presumptions 
that hobble its response to the presence of other actors in the treatymaking pro-
cess, particularly business actors.13  As a result, no international law regulates 
business participation in the making of treaties.14  U.S. domestic law, by contrast, 
has sophisticated campaign finance laws, requires lobbying disclosures, and fea-
tures democratic checks and balances.15  An international parallel is wholly ab-
sent.  And the international legal scholarship has evolved to mirror the law.  On 
the one hand, its robust analysis of treaty law has not yet fully grappled with busi-
ness contributions.16  On the other hand, its analysis of business roles in interna-
tional lawmaking has often trained its sights on private standard-setting and 
informal global governance, and has not yet attended fully to treaty making.17  
  
11. See discussion infra Part II (examining business participation in lawmaking in the context of the 
Cape Town Convention, the Rotterdam Rules, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership). 
12. See supra text accompanying note 11. 
13. See infra Part I.A. (outlining insufficiency of legal response to business).  See generally Nico Krisch, 
The Decay of Consent: International Law in an Age of Global Public Goods, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 39 
(2014) (finding that the necessity of state consent to international legal rules “has remained relatively 
resilient in formal international law” even at the expense of greater inefficiency and marginalization 
of those rules). 
14. See Anthea Roberts & Sandesh Sivakumaran, Lawmaking by Nonstate Actors: Engaging Armed 
Groups in the Creation of International Humanitarian Law, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 107, 113–14 (2012) 
(noting that officials charged with drafting international treaty law considered including rules 
addressing non-state actors, but ultimately excluded those rules); cf. JEAN D’ASPREMONT, 
PARTICIPANTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES ON 
NON-STATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 294 n.33 (2011) (identifying limitations of 
international legal rules applying to non-state actors). 
15. For example, in the United States, the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, 
Pub. L. No. 110-81, 121 Stat. 735, requires frequent disclosures regarding lobbying activities, 
including disclosures regarding the identity of lobbyists and the source of campaign contributions; 
regulates gifts that may be made to members of Congress; regulates the “revolving door” whereby 
previous members of Congress may become lobbyists; places extensive disclosure and other burdens 
on members of Congress who interact with lobbyists; and imposes penalties on lobbyists and 
congresspersons who violate the rules.  See generally Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 118, 121 (2010) (reviewing efforts to redress the “financial vulnerabilities of 
democracy”). 
16. For an overview of the treaty literature, see Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International 
Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 581 (2005). 
17. See e.g., JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS (2006) 
(discussing the proliferation of intergovernmental organizations, NGOs and multinational 
corporations, in addition to state actors, as significant governance actors); TIM BÜTHE & WALTER 
MATTLI, THE NEW GLOBAL RULERS: THE PRIVATIZATION OF REGULATION IN THE 
WORLD ECONOMY (2011) (discussing state delegation of regulatory power to international 
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Thus, comparatively little is known about business participation in treaty produc-
tion. 
Because little is known about business participation, little is known 
about the effect of that participation on a treaty’s success. Business input 
could help produce better treaties.  For example, it could produce more am-
bitious treaties; reduce transaction costs; facilitate a quicker, more effective 
bargain; or increase deliberation in a way that increases confidence in a treaty 
project.18  Conversely, business involvement could also hurt treaties.  It could 
impede consensual agreement between states; make the treaty process more 
lengthy or costly; inspire side bargains that undercut a treaty’s aims; or re-
duce transparency or democratic legitimacy.19  To make matters more com-
plicated, business participation—and the effect of that participation on treaty 
success—could vary along several dimensions, which this Article identifies.20    
Moreover, attention to business treaty making is necessary because a 
coherent legal response could aid business and lawmakers alike by promot-
ing key rule of law goods, such as certainty, predictability, and efficiency.21  
This Article proposes, as a preliminary matter, that there are clear short-
comings to the current under-regulated space.  Efficiency suffers as deci-
sionmakers create new procedural rules to govern non-state participation in 
addition to crafting the terms of a treaty’s substantive bargain.22  Solutions 
  
private-sector standard setting organizations); cf. Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. 
Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 20 (2005) 
(discerning “[f]ive main types of globalized administrative regulation” including hybrid forms that 
include private participation, but excluding consideration of treaty law). 
18. These possibilities are explored at greater length in Part III, infra.  They build on recent work by Paul 
Stephan, who used a cost-benefit analysis to determine the welfare effects of the participation of 
various non-state entities in law production.  See Paul B. Stephan, Privatizing International Law, 97 
VA. L. REV. 1573, 1577 (2011).  Stephan also noted the increasing role of private actors (including 
business actors) in the making of international law and the underexplored effects of this 
participation, though his work did not focus on the specific valence of business actors.  See id. 
19. See infra Part III.A. 
20. See id. 
21. For example, Lawrence Susskind, writing in a business journal, urges businesses concerned with 
environmental regulation to “play an active role in promoting the most useful reforms” of the 
international treatymaking system in order “to achieve greater uniformity, predictability and 
efficiency.”  Lawrence E. Susskind, New Corporate Roles in Global Environmental Treaty-Making, 27 
COLUM. J. WORLD BUS. 62, 71 (1992); see also Natasha Affolder, The Market for Treaties, 11 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 159, 159 (2010) (observing that business entities use treaty texts for their own purposes). 
22. For example, the international working group bearing the mandate to draft a proposed UN 
Business and Human Rights Treaty must decide whether and how to engage business actors in the 
treaty development process, and formulate a procedural structure to govern that engagement before 
developing the substance of the treaty.  See Human Rights Council Res. 26/9, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/RES/26/9 (July 14, 2014) (establishing an “intergovernmental working group . . . whose 
mandate shall be to elaborate an international legally binding instrument to regulate . . . the activities 
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are ad hoc,23 and business participants go underground.24  Legal rules could settle 
these problems, easing logjams and enhancing efficiency.25  Law could also help 
resolve persistent concerns about legitimacy and the accountability of interna-
tional decisionmakers.26 
Lawmakers and scholars therefore face an opportunity and an imperative to 
more fully understand business effects on treaty making, and to craft a theoreti-
cally coherent response to the business role.  This Article identifies two analytic 
models, proposed as ideal types, which might guide the development of a formal 
legal response.  The first I call an administrative model: It preserves the current 
public/private dichotomy and seeks to discipline private input in order to protect 
the integrity of public decision making.27  The second option I call a market 
model: It eliminates the public/private divide and views all stakeholders in the 
potential treaty bargain as equals in a contractually structured relationship.28  But 
the opportunity to craft a legal approach may be fleeting.  In the absence of theo-
retically principled prospective law making, law will not shape the facts but re-
spond to them,29 with unpredictable and possibly unsettling results. 
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows.  Part I traces treaty law’s 
outdated doctrinal assumptions about non-state actors, and its resulting ad hoc, 
inchoate response to business.  It also shows how the scholarly landscape mirrors 
the legal one: While attending carefully to treaty design features, the literature has 
not fully considered  business roles in treaty production.  Part II exposes the deep 
embeddedness of business in treaty making by examining three contemporary 
  
of transnational corporations and other business enterprises”); Interview with Anita Ramasastry, 
Univ. of Wash. Law Found. Prof. of Law, Univ. of Wash. Sch. of Law, in Seattle, Wash. (Jan. 
2015). 
23. See, e.g., Interview with Anita Ramasastry, supra note 22 (noting that the intergovernmental 
working group was faced with the challenge of developing a principled approach to business 
participation in the development of the UN Business and Human Rights Treaty); Kal Raustiala, 
NGOs in International Treaty-Making, in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO TREATIES 150 (Duncan B. 
Hollis ed., 2012) (reviewing some ad hoc accreditation regimes constructed by environmental 
treaties that permit business actors to serve as consultants). 
24. See infra Part I.A.1. 
25. See infra Part III.A. 
26. See infra Part III.B. 
27. See infra Part III.D.  The administrative model I propose builds on U.S. domestic administrative law 
scholarship.  See, e.g., Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 
(2000) (surveying approaches). 
28. See infra Part III.D. 
29. For an assertion that the role of business in formal international lawmaking is growing, see Stephan, 
supra note 18, at 1597 (noting that “there exists substantial indirect evidence that the role of 
organized private interests [including business entities] in upstream international lawmaking has 
grown in recent years”).  As Stephan articulates the point, “[p]rivatization is a process, not an 
outcome. In international law, this process proceeds apace.”  Id. at 1577 (footnote omitted). 
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treatymaking efforts, demonstrating that, for some treaties, business is involved at 
all relevant generative points: design; drafting; negotiation and adoption; ratifica-
tion; and implementation.  Part III identifies four significant implications of this 
deep business embeddedness, and outlines the prospective choices lawmakers and 
scholars are invited to confront. 
I.  THE OBSCURITY OF BUSINESS IN TREATY LAW  
A. Business in Treaty Law 
Despite great leaps forward in the past century, international law remains 
surprisingly stunted in an important area: It has not ordered the relationship 
between states and non-state entities in the treatymaking process.  Specifically, 
international law has not elaborated a coherent legal mechanism to structure, 
regulate, discipline, or incorporate the contributions of non-state actors with 
respect to the development of treaties.30  It is true that a particular subset of 
non-state actors have found a sort of accommodation through UN accredita-
tion regimes.31  But those regimes highlight both the lack of a comprehensive, 
systematic approach to non-state actors, and the lack of any regime at all that 
applies to market actors such as businesses.  This absence of legal oversight aris-
es from a distinctive kind of myopia in international law. 
1. Legal Myopia 
Nation-states are lawmakers.  So says the orthodoxy that has guided the de-
velopment of international legal rules since 1648.32  States may also lend their 
  
30. See infra Part I.A.1. 
31. See infra Part I.A.2. 
32. The year 1648 marks the Peace of Westphalia, the peace treaty that ended the Thirty Years’ War in 
the Holy Roman Empire and introduced the concept of the nation-state.  See, e.g., J.L. BRIERLY, 
THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 1 (Sir 
Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963) (explaining that the Peace of Westphalia introduced the 
concept of international law as “the body of rules and principles of action which are binding upon 
civilized states in their relations with one another”); Developments in the Law—Extraterritoriality, 
supra note 9, at 1228 (“In the centuries since the Treaty of Westphalia, the tenets of state sovereignty 
and territorial integrity have largely defined the international legal system.”); see also David Kennedy, 
International Law and the Nineteenth Century: History of an Illusion, 17 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 99, 112 
(1997) (describing the pre-Westphalian world as “a pre-legal international world of politics, war, 
religion, and ideology”). 
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lawmaking authority to other actors, such as international organizations.33  But 
the generosity of the orthodoxy ends there: Beyond exercising borrowed authori-
ty, non-state actors have no official capacity to make law.34  This first principle of 
international law has led to the significantly underdeveloped legal response to 
non-state actors in the international legal system.35 
International law’s unfledged response to non-state actors stems from its 
Westphalian, positivist roots.  The Westphalian idea is that nation-states are the 
only international entities that hold the privilege to determine their own fates.36  
As a result, states alone have rights and duties on the international stage.37  The 
positivist idea is that law acquires its force through the consent of the governed.38  
Because the governed, in the international context, are nation-states, the only 
  
33. See ALVAREZ, supra note 17 (providing a comprehensive review of lawmaking by international 
organizations); JAN KLABBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 53–73 (2d ed. 2009) (institutions with lawmaking and adjudicatory powers derive their 
authority from initial act of delegation); Duncan B. Hollis, Why State Consent Still Matters—Non-
State Actors, Treaties, and the Changing Sources of International Law, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 137, 
146–71 (2005) (describing lawmaking by various kinds of international organizations pursuant to 
delegation of authority from states). 
34. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 9, at 341 (footnote omitted) (“Since the Law of Nations is a law 
between States only and exclusively, States only and exclusively are subjects of the Law of Nations.”).  
But see KLABBERS, supra note 33 (noting that international organizations often reinterpret their 
powers in a way that is not fully controlled by that initial act of state delegation); Laurence R. Helfer, 
Nonconsensual International Lawmaking, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 72–74 (2008) (describing 
international lawmaking by international organizations as “nonconsensual” because states do not 
consent to the particular legal rules being produced).  See generally Krisch, supra note 13, at 39 
(finding that the necessity of state consent to international legal rules “has remained relatively 
resilient in formal international law” even at the expense of greater inefficiency and marginalization 
of those rules). 
35. The term “non-state actor” refers to actors that are not states, or, more specifically, “any organization 
that does not have a formal or legal status as a state or agent of a state, or as a constituent subunit of a 
state such as a province or municipality.”  Kal Raustiala & Natalie L. Bridgeman, Nonstate Actors in 
the Global Climate Regime 3 (UCLA Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper 
Series, Research Paper No. 07-29, 2007), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=1028603.  For an example of international law’s underdeveloped response to non-state actors, see 
generally Roberts & Sivakumaran, supra note 14 (observing the underdevelopment of international 
law’s accommodation of armed groups in creating the law that applies to their own behavior). 
36. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
37. See BRIERLY, supra note 32, at 1 (defining international law as “the body of rules and principles of 
action which are binding upon civilized states in their relations with one another”). 
38. See G. M. DANILENKO, LAW-MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 14–15 (1993); 
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 102(1) (1986) (rules of international law are those “that ha[ve] been accepted as such by 
the international community of states”); Krisch, supra note 13, at 39 (noting the resilience of the 
requirement of state consent in modern international law); Bruno Simma & Andreas L. Paulus, The 
Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflicts: A Positivist View, 93 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 302, 304 (1999) (noting that state consent may either be express or tacit). 
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norms that count as “law” are those to which states have consented.39  These 
positivist Westphalian foundations categorically exclude non-state actors from 
lawmaking power.40  As a corollary, not only are non-state actors unable to make 
formal law, but they are also absolved of the responsibility to abide by it, at least 
directly.41  Thus, to the extent that international law governs business or other 
private behavior, it does so by requiring nation-states to regulate them, with only 
some narrow exceptions.42 
  
39. The statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the most widely cited compendium of sources 
of international legal authority, demonstrates this state-centric orientation.  See Statute of the 
International Court of Justice art. 38, ¶ 1, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055.  The ICJ Statute offers the 
following as official forms of international law: 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules ex-
pressly recognized by the contesting states; 
b.  international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
d. . . . judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of 
the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. 
 Id.  As the statute demonstrates, the official sources of law are explicitly linked to the consent of 
nation-states.  Treaties, or “conventions,” are law because they articulate rules “expressly recognized 
by the . . . states.”  Id.  Of course, states alone may be parties to treaties.  Cf. Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, art. 34, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 341 (entered into force Jan. 27, 
1980) (establishing that treaties create obligations only on consenting state parties).  Custom and 
general principles arise from the practice of nation-states.  Judicial decisions and the writing of 
experts may be used to discern the law, but are not themselves law, as they are not expressions of the 
only relevant authors of law: nation-states.  Thus, the “general rule” is that international law is the 
product of states, and imposes obligations only on state and supranational organizations.  Carlos M. 
Vázquez, Direct Vs. Indirect Obligations of Corporations Under International Law, 43 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 927, 930 (2005). 
40. See supra note 39.  As Michael Reisman and his coauthors articulate this, “individuals not associated 
with the state” are “a class that classical international law all but disenfranchised.  In the past, the 
international lawyer’s client was, for the most part, the Prince or, put in more prosaic terms, 
governments, however they were organized.”  W. Michael Reisman et al., The New Haven School: A 
Brief Introduction, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 575, 576 (2007).  While states are the official signatories to 
treaties, international organizations can also play roles in treaty drafting, ratification, or enforcement.  
See José E. Alvarez, Governing the World: International Organizations as Lawmakers, 31 SUFFOLK 
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 591, 591–92 (2008).  As this Article shows, business actors play an 
underappreciated role in the process as well.  See infra Part II. 
41. See, e.g., Vázquez, supra note 39, at 930 (noting the “general rule” that international law obligations 
rest on states and international organizations alone; to the extent that international law governs 
corporate or other private behavior, it does so by requiring states to regulate those non-state actors, 
rather than by requiring businesses themselves to comply). 
42. See, e.g., KATE PARLETT, THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: 
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 27–29 (2011) (explaining that the rights, 
obligations and capacities of individuals under international law are dependent on the recognition of 
those attributes by states); Shima Baradaran et al., Does International Law Matter?, 97 MINN. L. 
REV. 743, 771 (2013) (acknowledging that compliance with international law “occurs when nations 
behave as their governments have agreed to under international law; conversely, violations of 
international law result when nations depart from agreed upon actions”; for example, states 
“formal[ly]” comply when they establish the regulatory system a treaty requires, although that formal 
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In the last century and a half, international law’s positivist Westphalian 
character has been under siege as international organizations and individuals have 
been granted authority and responsibilities.43  Notwithstanding these changes, 
the state-centric foundations of international law are still unmistakable in its pre-
sent architecture.  For instance, the enduring doctrine of sources continues to dic-
tate that whether an international norm is law depends on whether that norm has 
secured the consent of states.  And the system’s state-centric roots have thwarted 
the growth of areas of law that address other actors besides states.44  Among the 
underdeveloped areas is the one this Article seeks to illuminate: international laws 
relating to treaty making.45  
What are the international laws relating to treaty making? The key starting 
point is the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: a set of rules often referred 
to as the “treaty on treaties,”46 which governs written international agreements 
  
compliance may be meaningless if private actors do not comply with those state regulations); 
Durkee, supra note 8, at 64–65 (noting that unique kinds of compliance problems arise in 
international law when states are responsible for ensuring that private actors comply with the state’s 
treaty obligations).  But see Vázquez, supra note 39, at 933–34 (listing some narrow exceptions which 
include circumstances in which private entities act on behalf of the state and those private acts are 
attributed to the state). 
43. See Krisch, supra note 13, at 1 (“While surprisingly resilient in the face of . . . challenges, the 
consensual structure [of the international legal order] has seen renewed attacks in recent years.”).  For 
example, in the remarkable period of law-generation after World War II, states created international 
organizations and imbued them with derivative authority.  See generally ALVAREZ, supra note 17 
(recording the proliferation of intergovernmental organizations, NGOs and multinational 
corporations as significant governance actors in addition to state actors); IAN BROWNLIE, 
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 675 (7th ed. 2008) (examining the basis of 
authority of international organizations).  Over time, those international organizations acquired 
some forms of lawmaking power and other rights and duties previously available only to states.  See 
generally ALVAREZ, supra note 17 (examining powers international organizations have acquired to 
interpret their own constitutive charters, and engage in various forms of rule making, treaty making, 
and adjudication).  And, finally, in the past century states began to recognize that individuals have 
international significance, in that they can bear internationally relevant rights and international 
liability for crimes.  See generally BROWNLIE, supra note 43, at 553, 587 (reviewing the development 
of the concept of internationally protected human rights and individual liability for international 
crimes); MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 232–240 (6th ed. 2008) (same). 
44. See Roberts & Sivakumaran, supra note 14, at 112–113. 
45. See Larry Catá Backer, Private Actors and Public Governance Beyond the State: The Multinational 
Corporation, the Financial Stability Board, and the Global Governance Order, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL 
LEGAL STUD. 751, 752 (2011) (characterizing the persistent public/private divide as akin to a “color 
line,” creating an artificial hierarchy in which one group is arbitrarily recognized as the sole 
“legitimate producer of regulation”). 
46. See, e.g., ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 5 (3d ed. 2013) (“For good 
reason, the [Vienna] Convention has been called the ‘treaty on treaties.’”); Richard D. Kearney & 
Robert E. Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64 AM. J. INT’L L. 495, 495 (1970) (referencing the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties).  See generally Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, supra note 39. 
Business of Treaties 275 
 
 
between states.47  Thus, at the outset, the treaty erects a divide between different 
kinds of international agreements based on the identity of the parties to the 
agreement: Agreements with just state actors lie on one side of the divide, and 
agreements with any other kind of actor lies on the other.  The Vienna Conven-
tion is only concerned with the first set.48  In addition, the Vienna Convention 
does not include any rules that apply to non-state actors,49 despite the fact that 
the treaty elaborates a broad compendium of rules that guide many aspects of 
treaty making and application of treaty provisions.50  The comprehensiveness of 
the Vienna Convention rules is noteworthy because it contextualizes the absence 
of any rules relating to non-state actors.  The Convention does not address, for 
instance, whether attempts by non-state actors to offer authoritative interpreta-
tions of treaty terms have any legal significance; whether participation by non-
state actors in the drafting or negotiating of a treaty affects the significance of the 
treaty’s legislative history; whether other stakeholders besides states have any 
  
47. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 39, at art. 1, 1155 U.N.T.S. 333 
(“The present Convention applies to treaties between States.”). Most of these rules have universal 
application because of their codification of and acceptance into customary international law.  See 
Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Custom on a Sliding Scale, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 146, 149 n.16 (1987) (noting “the 
readiness of international tribunals to accept, as custom, the major substantive provisions of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties”) (citing Ian McTaggart Sinclair, The Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties: The Consequences of Participation and Nonparticipation, 78 ASIL PROC. 271, 
273 (1984) (providing a partial list of decisions)); see also Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, 
Treaties, Human Rights and Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 424 (2000) (noting that 
U.S. scholars and executive branch officials accept that many provisions of the Vienna Convention 
reflect the general customary international law of treaties to which all nations are bound). 
48. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 39, at art. 1, 1155 U.N.T.S. 333 
(“The present Convention applies to treaties between States.”); see also Maria Frankowska, The 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Before United States Courts, 28 VA. J. INT’L L. 281, 292 n.45 
(1988) (noting that the U.S. delegation made an attempt at the outset of the negotiations of the 
Vienna Convention to extend the scope of the Convention to cover international organizations, but 
later withdrew the proposal); Roberts & Sivakumaran, supra note 14, at 113–14 (noting that the 
international law commission “when preparing a draft of what was to become the Vienna 
Convention . . . considered the possibility of various other subjects entering into treaties with states, 
but ultimately excluded the issue from the [Convention’s] purview”). 
49. A survey of the text of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties reveals the absence.  See 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 39; see also Raustiala, supra note 23, at 156 
(noting that the Vienna Convention “though central to many treaty issues, is silent on NGOs’ role”); 
see generally AUST, supra note 46, at 6–7 (providing a detailed examination of treaty law as established 
by the Vienna Convention); Kearney & Dalton, supra note 46 (discussing the drafting history of the 
Vienna Convention). 
50. These rules include which state officials have authority to sign a treaty on behalf of the state, Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 39, at arts. 7–8, 1155 U.N.T.S. 334, what procedural 
steps are necessary for the treaty to acquire the force of law, id. at arts. 10–17, 24, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
335–36, 338, methods of interpreting ambiguous treaty provisions, id. at arts. 31–33, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
340, rules applying to fraud, coercion, and error, id. at arts. 48–52, 1155 U.N.T.S. 344, means of 
dissolving the agreement, id. at arts. 54–67, 1155 U.N.T.S 344–48, and many others. 
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right to consult with state lawmakers during the treatymaking process; or an-
ything else related to the potential and actual roles of non-state actors at any point 
in the generation, implementation, or enforcement of a treaty.51  No treaty pro-
vides a systematic parallel set of rules governing international agreements be-
tween states and all other kinds of actors.  The Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties Between States and International Organizations governs, eponymously, 
agreements between states and international organizations.52  But the existence of 
this treaty highlights the absence of similar laws relating to agreements between 
states and other kinds of non-state actors, such as businesses.53 
At first blush, the lack of law structuring non-state participation in lawmak-
ing may seem reasonable.  After all, states are the lawmakers.  No other actor has 
a de jure role.  But that orthodox divide both masks and fails to respond to the 
significant de facto roles of various non-state entities.  I outline these business 
roles in Part II. 
2. A Partial Fix 
One particular kind of non-state entity demanded accommodation in the 
international treatymaking process at the birth of the UN system.54  This entity 
is the nongovernmental organization, or NGO.  By the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, NGOs had begun to take significant roles in agitating for 
new international laws.55  In 1945, these organizations turned up en masse in 
San Francisco for the negotiation of the UN Charter.56  Their presence at that 
  
51. See, e.g., Roberts & Sivakumaran, supra note 14, at 139 (citing Marco Sassòli, Possible Legal 
Mechanisms to Improve Compliance by Armed Groups with International Humanitarian Law and 
International Human Rights Law 6 (Nov. 13, 2003) (unpublished manuscript), http://www. 
genevacall.org/resources/other-documents-studies/f-other-documents-studies/2001-2010/2003-
13nov-sassoli.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8BV-74FC] (proposing that armed groups should be given a 
right to consult in humanitarian lawmaking processes). 
52. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or 
Between International Organizations, opened for signature March 21, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 543. 
53. In addition, no authoritative set of international rules governs agreements between states and 
substate entities (like individual states within the United States, armed groups, or state secessionists), 
nonprofit organizations, individuals, multinational corporations, or other kinds of market actors.  Cf. 
D’ASPREMONT, supra note 14, at 294 n.33; Frankowska, supra note 48, at 292 n.45 (“Questions that 
may arise in regard to a treaty and the succession of States . . . are excluded from the scope of the 
Convention.”). 
54. See Raustiala, supra note 23, at 153 (offering reasons why NGOS “grew more prominent in world 
politics” after World War II). 
55. Id. at 151 (noting that “NGOs were hardly unknown” before World War II, but that their number 
remained limited, as did the scope of their activities). 
56. Id. at 156 (“[A]bout 1200 NGOs attended the San Francisco conference in June of 1945 establishing 
the UN”); see also Steve Charnovitz, Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law, 100 AM. 
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conference—in addition to their earlier activities—prompted the states negotiat-
ing the UN charter to find some way to accommodate them in the UN system.57  
As a result, NGOs were allowed to apply for “accreditation” with the United Na-
tions and serve as consultants to the UN as it coordinates treaty making and other 
tasks—an opportunity that over 4000 organizations have taken to date.58 
Since the UN system sponsors the majority of contemporary treaty negotia-
tions and conferences, the UN rules and practices determine, to a significant extent, 
how NGOs influence treaty making.59  A brief survey of the UN accreditation re-
gime will illuminate both its nature and its limitations.  Pursuant to the UN Char-
ter, the UN’s Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) is empowered to make 
arrangements to consult with organizations “concerned with matters within its 
competence.”60  Exercising that authority, ECOSOC has established three types 
of consultative relationships for which NGOs may apply.61  The relationships 
carry varying privileges, such as attending meetings, submitting written state-
ments, and raising issues for the Council’s consideration.62  Critically, accred-
  
J. INT’L L. 348, 358 (2006) (noting that a “rainbow of NGOs in 1945 sought to gain such a foothold 
in the UN Charter”). 
57. See Raustiala, supra note 23, at 156; see also Charnovitz, supra note 56, at 358 (stating that NGOs 
were notable for their “entrepreneurial role . . . at the San Francisco Conference in lobbying for and 
securing Article 71 so as to endow themselves with an official status”).  The birth of the United 
Nations accelerated the development and significance of NGOs because it became a centralized 
forum for treaty making and began accrediting NGOs to participate in its work.  See Raustiala, supra 
note 23, at 151.  Raustiala offers other reasons for the rise in NGO activity: technological change 
that made cross-border communication and travel easier; the move to codification in international 
law, which gave NGOs opportunities to try to influence developing legal rules; the spread of 
democratic states, which were more likely to produce and tolerate NGOs; and the increasing scope 
of international law rules to areas once solely the province of domestic governments.  Id. at 153–55. 
58. Consultative Status With ECOSOC and Other Accreditations, U.N. DEP’T ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS: 
NGO BRANCH, http://esango.un.org/civilsociety/displayConsultativeStatusSearch.do?method 
=search&sessionCheck=false [http://perma.cc/73YC-LWMS] (last visited Dec. 16, 2015) (showing 
that as of July 2015, over 4000 groups had obtained accreditation); see also Raustiala, supra note 23, at 
156 (noting that the number of accredited NGOs rose sharply in the 1990s—in 1946, ECOSOC 
had accredited only forty-one organizations, by 1992 the number had risen to approximately seven 
hundred, and reached the thousands by the end of the decade). 
59. See Raustiala, supra note 23, at 156. 
60. U.N. CHARTER art. 71. 
61. Dana Brakman Reiser & Claire R. Kelly, Linking NGO Accountability and the Legitimacy of Global 
Governance, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1011, 1054 (2011). 
62. See id.; see also Raustiala, supra note 23, at 156 n.25 (“General consultative status is reserved for 
international NGOs whose area of work covers most of the issues on the agenda of ECOSOC and 
its subsidiary bodies.  These tend to be fairly large, established international NGOs with a broad 
geographical reach.  Special consultative status is granted to NGOs, which have a special competence 
in, and are concerned specifically with, only a few of the ECOSOC fields of activity.  These NGOs 
tend to be smaller and more recently established. Organizations that apply for consultative status but 
do not fit in any of the other categories are usually included in the Roster.  These NGOs tend to have 
a rather narrow and/or technical focus.”). 
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itation entitles NGOs to participate in UN-sponsored treaty processes.63  An 
NGO can apply to the UN Secretariat for accreditation to a particular treaty con-
ference, indicating its areas of particular competence and the “relevance of its activi-
ties to the work of the conference.”64  If the UN Secretariat grants accreditation, the 
NGO may attend all future sessions of the treaty conference.65  For example, the 
NGO can participate in working groups and may participate in floor debates 
when allowed by the session chairperson.66  The result of this accreditation process 
is that UN-sponsored treaty negotiations or conferences now regularly have “a 
sizeable, sometimes enormous, NGO component.”67 
But the scope of the UN accreditation regime is limited to NGOs, and tai-
lored to include traditional members of civil society while excluding other non-
state actors, such as state-based organizations, armed groups, or market actors.  
The “ideal type” that the accreditation regime anticipates is a nonprofit, issue-
oriented organization, such as Greenpeace or Médecins Sans Frontières.68  For 
example, the ECOSOC accreditation criteria demand, among other things, that 
an accredited organization have “a democratically adopted constitution,” the 
“authority to speak for its members through its authorized representatives,” and 
“aims and purposes” that are consistent with the “spirit, purposes and principles 
of the . . . United Nations.”69  Multinational corporations and other business 
  
63. Peter L. Lallas, The Role of Process and Participation in the Development of Effective International 
Environmental Agreements: A Study of the Global Treaty on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs), 19 
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 83, 118–19 (2000) (noting that, according to ECOSOC rules, 
“NGOs having consultative status with ECOSOC . . . ‘shall, as a rule be accredited for 
participation’” in international treaty conferences convened by the United Nations); see also Paul 
Wapner, Defending Accountability in NGOs, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 197, 203 (2002) (noting that 
participation in UN-sponsored treaty making “has been essential for NGO influence on 
international treaties”). 
64. Lallas, supra note 63, at 119 (citing Economic and Social Council Res. 1996/31, ¶¶ 43–44 (July 25, 
1996)). 
65. Id. 
66. See id.  However, NGOs are not allowed a “negotiating role” in treaty making.  See Economic and 
Social Council Res. 1996/31, supra note 64, at ¶ 50. (“In recognition of the intergovernmental nature 
of the conference and its preparatory process, active participation of non-governmental organizations 
therein, while welcome, does not entail a negotiating role.”). 
67. Raustiala, supra note 23, at 7. 
68. The ECOSOC website describes the groups anticipated by these criteria as “international, regional, 
sub-regional, national non-governmental organizations, non-profit organizations, public sector or 
voluntary organizations.”  Introduction to ECOSOC Consultative Status, U.N. DEP’T ECON. & SOC. 
AFFAIRS: NGO BRANCH, http://csonet.org/index.php?menu=30 [http://perma.cc/H9C5-K7HT] 
(last visited Dec. 16, 2015). 
69. Economic and Social Council Res. 1996/31, supra note 64, ¶¶ 2, 10, 11.  Additional criteria require 
that organizations seeking accreditation be “concerned with matters falling within the competence of 
the Economic and Social Council and its subsidiary bodies,” id. ¶ 1; be “of recognized standing 
within the particular field of its competence or of a representative character,” id. ¶ 9; have established 
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entities are excluded from consultative status because they are not nonprofits.70  
They may also have trouble demonstrating that they have “aims and purposes” 
that involve furthering the “spirit, purposes, or principles” of the UN Charter ra-
ther than, for instance, generating revenue for shareholders.71 
Other international organizations have replicated the UN accreditation re-
gime, and usually closely track ECOSOC’s basic model, including its exclusion of 
businesses.72  And the ECOSOC model also serves as the basis for ad hoc projects 
by particular treaties, which also exclude businesses73 (though there are exceptions 
that will be explored more fully in the next Subpart).74 As a result, the internation-
al system fails to accommodate business actors in the one way it has managed to 
accommodate other non-state actors—through accreditation regimes. 
One consequence of excluding individual business entities from these ac-
creditation regimes is that business entities have appropriated the traditional 
NGO format—that is, these businesses form their own NGO organizations to 
advance their interests within the United Nations75—and partnered with exist-
ing NGOs that serve as agents for the business entity.76  Thus, the exclusion of 
  
headquarters, id. ¶ 10; have deposited its democratically adopted constitution with the UN, id.; and 
not be “established by governmental entity or intergovernmental agreement,” id. ¶ 12. 
70. See id. ¶ 13 (stipulating that “[t]he basic resources of the organization shall be derived in the main 
from contributions of the national affiliates or other components or from individual members”). 
71. Id. ¶ 2. Other entities besides businesses that are excluded by these criteria include governmental or 
intergovernmental organizations, id. ¶ 12, individuals (such as individual academics, state officials, 
philanthropists, religious figures, etc.), see id. ¶ 5 (stating that consultative relationships may be made 
with organizations), and secessionist or other armed groups with governmental ambitions, see id. ¶ 4 
(defining the relevant organizations as nongovernmental). 
72. Raustiala, supra note 23, at 157 (other organizations include the World Health Organization 
(WHO) and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), among others). 
73. See supra Part I.A.3. 
74. For example, the Global Treaty on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) based its accreditation 
regime directly on the ECOSOC accreditation regime.  See Lallas, supra, note 63, at 118–21 (noting 
that NGOs participated in the International Negotiating Committee set up to develop the terms of 
the POPs treaty, and the rules of procedure developed to govern that participation were “drawn up 
within the framework of applicable rules of the United Nations,” particularly the ECOSOC 
accreditation rules). 
75. JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 489 (2000) (noting 
that “[a] newer kind of business organization is the corporate front group which presents itself to the 
community as an NGO rather than a business organization,” and explaining that these NGOs take 
advantage of UN accreditation regimes). 
76. See Nuria Molina-Gallart, Strange Bedfellows? NGO-Corporate Relations in International 
Development: An NGO Perspective, 1 DEV. STUD. RES. 42, 43–44 (2014) (noting that NGO and 
corporate partnerships are increasing, and attributing this growth to the need of NGOs for funding); 
Fairouz El Tom, Diversity and Inclusion on NGO Boards: What the Stats Say, THE GUARDIAN (May 
7, 2013, 5:56 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/ 
2013/apr/29/diversity-inclusion-ngo-board [http://perma.cc/P99X-6AKT] (finding that over half 
of the “top 100 NGOs” in his study had one or more board members affiliated with companies that 
invest in or provide services to the arms, tobacco, and financing industries); Kultida Samabuddhi, 
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market actors in the accreditation regimes both leaves a legal gap, and drives 
business participation underground.77 
Significantly, the UN accreditation regime and its progeny serve as the only 
regulation or accommodation of non-state actor roles in the international treaty 
making process.  There is simply no other set of legal rules available.78  Thus, to 
the extent the regime is insufficient, its limitations expose the legal gap this Arti-
cle seeks to highlight.  There is no coherent legal regime, set of best practices, or 
other guidelines that govern business roles in treaty making.  Specifically, there is 
no general UN accreditation regime for businesses, as there is for NGOs.   
3. The Legal Void 
The accommodations for business roles that do exist are ad hoc and sui gen-
eris.  In fact, these legal structures make strange bedfellows under one heading.  
But the diverse nature of these structures may serve to highlight the absence of a 
consistent legal approach.  After all, one way to clarify the nature of a void is to 
identify the things that do in fact exist. 
Business entities have official, legally formalized means of shaping the con-
tent of treaties in two notable instances.  The most obvious example is the Inter-
national Labor Organization (the ILO), which has “a highly unusual structure 
in which labour unions and businesses are formal participants in the ILO’s work 
and deliberative processes.”79  The ILO describes its structure as “tripartite,”—
bringing together labor unions, businesses, and nation-states—and acknowl-
edges that this structure makes the ILO unique among international organiza-
tions.80  That uniqueness is contextualized by the ILO’s age.  The organization 
was created in 1919 as part of the Treaty of Versailles that ended World War 
I—thus the organization predates the entire UN system by over 25 years.  The 
fact that the ILO is still, almost a century after its formation, the only example of 
  
Money Can Taint NGO’s Clean Image, GLOB. POLICY F. (Mar. 4, 2011), 
https://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/introduction/49912-money-can-taint-ngos-clean-image.html 
[https://perma.cc/9GYN-QJDJ] (noting that corporate partnerships can raise suspicion for NGOs, 
as critics worry that corporate sponsorship will produce NGO mission drift); see also Robert W. Fri, 
The Corporation as Nongovernment Organization, 27 COLUM. J. WORLD BUS. 90, 90 (1992) 
(recommending that business entities consider participating in UN activities by sponsoring or 
partnering with NGOs). 
77. Kal Raustiala, Nonstate Actors in the Global Climate Regime 96, in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE (Urs Luterbacher & Detlef F. Sprinz, eds., 2001). 
78. While it is difficult to prove a negative, it is at is at least possible to state with confidence that there is 
no other law of general applicability. 
79. Raustiala, supra note 23, at 158. 
80. About the ILO: Structure, INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/who-we-
are/lang—en/index.htm [http://perma.cc/BX5K-QBYJ] (last visited Dec. 16, 2015). 
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explicit participation by business actors as official coauthors of treaties demon-
strates the virtually complete exclusion of business actors from all other formal 
treatymaking roles. 
The second official role business takes in treaty making is more attenuated.  
In fact, it is better characterized as a “quasi” official role and takes place through 
incorporation of privately created international standards into treaty law.81  The 
World Trade Organization (WTO) subsidiary agreement related to food and 
agricultural safety is a prime example.82  The Application of Sanitary and Phyto-
sanitary Measures adopts the authoritative food safety standards developed by 
private actors.83  To be clear, this example does not show a legal regime like 
NGO accreditation in which private entities are invited to provide input, or 
like the ILO, where business entities participate in setting the terms of the 
agreement.  Rather, the treaty simply creates a presumption that member states 
have complied with its terms when those members follow privately elaborated 
standards.84  The business contribution is thus attenuated, but the example shows 
one of the limited instances in which modern treaty law recognizes private input.85 
Finally, some treaty-specific accreditation regimes that otherwise fol-
low the UN accreditation model modify the accreditation criteria to empha-
size relevant expertise rather than, for example, nonprofit status.  Environmental 
law is a significant area where this occurs.86  For example, the 1973 Convention 
on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) included language 
  
81. See generally BÜTHE & MATTLI, supra note 17 (describing a variety of areas where private standards 
are incorporated into international law). 
82. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Jan. 1, 1995, 1867 U.N.T.S. 
493.   
83. See Markus Wagner, International Standards, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE WTO AND 
TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE 238–40 (Tracey Epps & Michael J. Trebilcock eds., 2013) 
[hereinafter Wagner, International Standards] (clarifying that those international standards are often 
privately elaborated; “[t]his inclusion of ‘international standards’ into agreements covered by the 
WTO’s dispute settlement system elevates these texts from their previous status of voluntary 
endeavors to one which makes adherence to them virtually mandatory”); Markus Wagner, 
Regulatory Space in International Trade Law and International Investment Law, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 
1, 56–58 (2014) [hereinafter Wagner, Regulatory Space] (describing mechanism whereby the SPS 
Agreement incorporates international standards).  Wagner also describes the similar incorporation of 
private standards into the WTO’s Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, which relates to 
“technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures.”  See Wagner, International 
Standards, supra, at 239. 
84. See Wagner, International Standards, supra note 83, at 238–39; Wagner, Regulatory Space, supra note 
83, at 56. 
85. See generally BÜTHE & MATTLI, supra note 17 (surveying other instances); Julian Arato, 
Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J.  229 (2015) (showing that business entities engage 
in arbitration that helps define the interpretation of terms of Bilateral Investment Treaties); 
Vázquez, supra note 39 (noting that corporations hold various kinds of authority delegated by states). 
86. See Raustiala, supra note 23, at 160–161. 
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allowing the treaty secretariat to allow consultation by “suitable . . . non-
governmental international or national agencies and bodies technically qualified 
in protection, conservation, and management of wild fauna and flora.”87  The 
CITES treaty does not make any further restrictions that would limit business 
participation.  Rather, the door is open to any entity with helpful technical ex-
pertise.88  Later environmental treaties feature almost identical provisions.  The 
1987 Montreal Protocol on Ozone Depletion and 1992 UN Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change both allow accreditation to “any body or agency” 
that “is qualified in matters covered by the Convention.”89  Thus, these treaty re-
gimes do not distinguish between the archetypal NGOs on the one hand, and 
various forms of market actors on the other.  But these accreditation regimes are 
treaty-specific.  They provide rules of engagement only for those specific treaty 
regimes, rather than offering a systemic accommodation or response to market 
actors in the treatymaking process. 
* * * 
It is puzzling that the law regulating non-state actors—in particular busi-
ness actors—has remained so underdeveloped, because modern treaty regimes 
have otherwise become increasingly sophisticated.90  Treaties became the most 
significant means of formal international lawmaking in the twentieth century, 
and now govern a staggeringly broad array of international issues: climate change, 
international trade, laws of war, law of the sea, investment, human rights, arms 
trading, asylum law—the list goes on.  At the same time, the proposition that 
treaties are an effective tool of global governance is highly contested.  Critics 
  
87. Id. at 161 (providing that consultation will be allowed unless one-third of treaty parties exist). 
88. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora art. 7, Mar. 3, 
1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 14537. 
89. See Raustiala, supra note 23, at 161.  The full text of the provision in the UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change reads as follows: 
Any body or agency, whether national or international, governmental or non-
governmental, which is qualified in matters covered by the Convention, and which 
has informed the secretariat of its wish to be represented at a session of the Confer-
ence of the Parties as an observer, may be so admitted unless at least one-third of the 
Parties present object. 
 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 7, ¶ 6, Mar. 21, 1994, 31 I.L.M. 
849, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107; see also Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 
art. 11, ¶ 5, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1541, 1522 U.N.T.S. 28 (rather than “matters covered by the 
Convention” the text reads “qualified in fields relating to the protection of the ozone layer”; otherwise 
the provisions of the UNFCCC and Montreal Protocol are identical). 
90. Modern treaty regimes have complex multistage formation processes, opt-in and opt-out clauses, 
supplemental declarations, and other sophisticated design features that respond to the complex 
demands of groups of differently situated parties responding to multifaceted problems.  See, e.g., 
Raustiala, Form and Substance, supra note 16 (collecting literature that evaluates the features of treaty 
design, implementation, and enforcement that correspond to treaty success). 
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complain, for example, that the treatymaking process is too slow, cumbersome, 
and incapable of change.91  The importance of understanding non-state, particu-
larly business, roles in treaty making is thus highlighted by the continued im-
portance of treaties as a lawmaking tool, and the challenges treaties face in 
legislating effectively.92   
B. Business in Treaty Literature 
The scholarship studying and evaluating international treaty making closely 
parallels the architecture of treaty law.  That is, the treaty literature has principally 
focused attention on state rights and responsibilities, state behavior, and treaty 
design by state actors.  It has also observed and critiqued the rise of NGO partici-
pation in treaty making. But its consideration of business roles in treatymaking 
has been more limited. Of course, liberal theory has highlighted the way non-
state entities, including business actors, can shape a state’s legal choices. Other 
literature has focused on how business creates legal norms outside the formal in-
ternational lawmaking system and sets standards that are later imported into 
formal law.  What merits further examination, this Article asserts, is the way 
businesses directly shape international treaty law. 
1. States and Their Influencers 
The literature that addresses treaty making has focused principally on state 
behavior.93  This scholarship has borrowed from international relations theory to 
  
91. See, e.g., Cho & Kelly, supra note 7, at 497 & nn.13–14, 498 & nn.15–17 (collecting literature on 
multilateral treaty failures and identifying why treaties are ineffective at coordinating global financial 
regulations); see also Durkee, supra note 8 (identifying various critiques of treaty effectiveness). One 
response to this criticism of treaties is the turn away from treaties, and the blossoming of nontreaty 
forms of governance.  See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 
J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 171, 187–88 (2010) (defining and examining the uses of “soft law,” that is, 
nonbinding norms, including various forms of informal coordination and cooperation between 
states, substate entities, private parties, and nongovernmental organizations who pool knowledge, set 
standards, and coordinate responses to common problems). 
92. See Durkee, supra note 8, at 75–77 (collecting literature explaining why treaties are necessary to 
structure international organizations, courts, and governance regimes, as well as to confer legitimacy, 
coordinate regulation, and prevent regulatory “leakage”). 
93. Borrowing fruitfully from international relations scholarship, this literature inquires how state 
behavior and relationships give rise to agreements, and when and why those agreements become 
effective.  The debate is longstanding and rich.  For significant contributions, see generally ABRAM 
CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 3 (1995) (setting out “managerial” theory of 
compliance); THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 
7–9 (1995) (states will commit to and comply with regimes they perceive to be legitimate); 
284 63 UCLA L. REV. 264 (2016) 
 
 
produce productive insights about why states comply with treaties,94 and has close-
ly analyzed the connection between treaty design features and state compliance.95   
Liberal theory was the first to acknowledge the significance of non-state ac-
tors in the sense that it discarded the fiction that the state is a nonporous mono-
lith.96  It recognized that individual officials make decisions on behalf of the state, 
and that non-state actors influence those officials to shape state behavior interna-
tionally.97  Network theory, a strand of liberal theory, recognizes that substate ac-
tors such as judges, legislators, regulators, prosecutors, and the like, communicate 
with their counterparts across national borders to coordinate efforts, borrow 
  
GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 9, at 3 (analyzing commitment and compliance through a 
rational choice theory); Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 
CALIF. L. REV. 1823, 1825 (2002) (noting that states comply with international law to preserve 
reputations and avoid informal and formal sanctions).  One body of scholarship has centrally 
grappled with the core puzzle of whether, and why, in the absence of a global enforcer, sovereign 
states will subject themselves to binding agreements.  See generally Robert O. Keohane, International 
Relations and International Law: Two Optics, 38 HARV. INT’L L. J. 487 (1997) (collecting literature).  
A related body of literature considers how various features of treaty design contribute to treaty 
success.  See, e.g., Raustiala, Form and Substance, supra note 16, at 581 (analyzing the relationship 
between different types of treaty commitment: differences include, inter alia, whether the agreement 
is binding or nonbinding, whether the agreement gives jurisdiction to any institution to monitor or 
enforce compliance, and to whom rights of enforcement are afforded). 
94. See generally CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 93, at 3 (proposing a “managerial model” of 
compliance); FRANCK, supra note 93, at 7–8 (arguing that international rules attract compliance 
when they are perceived to be “fair”); HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: 
THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE 3–4 (4th ed. 1967) (using realist political theory to 
explain compliance); Baradaran et al., supra note 42, at 749–51 (presenting the results of a “large-
scale international field experiment” designed to test the prevailing compliance theories); Durkee, 
supra note 8, at 67–68 (noting that private sector assent affects compliance in the context of 
“persuasion” treaties); Hathaway, supra note 9, at 477–83 (separating compliance theories along a 
“rational actor” and “normative” divide); Keohane, supra note 93, at 489–94 (comparing 
instrumentalist and normative compliance theories); Beth A. Simmons, Money and the Law: Why 
Comply With the Public International Law of Money?, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 323, 324 (2000) (arguing 
that nations commit to complying with international law when they can credibly do so). 
95. See Raustiala, Form and Substance, supra note 16 (collecting literature directing attention to the 
features of international treaties, and the correlation between various treaty features and the ultimate 
success of the treaty regime by various measures). 
96. Liberal theory was the first to “open[] the black box of the state” and consider the role of substate 
actors.  See Hathaway, supra note 10, at 1961; see also Moravcsik, supra note 10, at 513 (elaborating 
liberal theory in international relations; explaining that domestic constituencies construct state 
interests). 
97. See Hathaway, supra note 10, at 1961; see also Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age of 
Globalization, 98 MICH. L. REV. 167, 168–70 (1999) (noting the inadequacy of the Westphalian 
paradigm and conceiving of the sovereign state as an agent of small interest groups); Rachel 
Brewster, The Domestic Origins of International Agreements, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 501, 502 (2004) 
(international agreements are one means by which domestic interest groups attempt to set domestic 
policy and develop domestic law). 
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knowledge, and develop norms.98  Non-state actors are thus understood to af-
fect lawmaking by influencing state officials, both domestically and through 
cross-border networks.99 As the transnational legal process account explains, 
these interactions between state officials and others—like international organ-
izations, multinational enterprises, NGOs, and individuals—lead to both in-
ternational lawmaking and implementation of those international norms into 
domestic law.100   
  
98. Anne Marie Slaughter was the pioneer of this work.  See generally ANNE MARIE SLAUGHTER, A 
NEW WORLD ORDER (2004) (asserting that the state is “disaggregated” as substate officials 
network across borders to pool knowledge and set policy).  Even before Slaughter’s seminal work, 
Philip Jessup had introduced the term “transnational law” to describe the fact that many features of 
the international system transcend national boundaries and include elements of both public and 
private international law.  See PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 106 (1956); see also Maya 
Steinitz, Transnational Legal Process Theories, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
ADJUDICATION 340, 341–43 (Cesare PR Romano, Karen J Alter & Yuval Shany eds., 2014) 
(reviewing developments in transnational legal theory). 
99. Network theory is in some ways an intellectual heir of the New Haven School of Policy-Oriented 
Jurisprudence.  See Reisman, supra note 40, at 577 (advocating for a functional analysis rather than a 
formalist one, seeking to map formal lawmaking and compliance—among other international legal 
processes—in terms of a social process in which actors with different kinds of power and strategic 
goals engage with each other across a variety of situations).  The New Haven School has highlighted 
the difference between the “law-in-the-books” and the “law-in-action,” noting that the content of 
formal sources of international law—that is, what the relevant treaties or custom demand—do not 
fully explain why international actors behave the way that they do.  See id.  Notably, for our purposes, 
the New Haven school considers the relevant actors in this process to be not just “those formally 
endowed with decision competence, such as executives, legislators and judges” but also those who do 
not have formal roles in the international system such as “non-governmental organizations, pressure 
groups, interest groups, gangs, and individuals.”  Id. at 578 (footnotes omitted). 
100. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2603, 2656 
(1997) (positing that government officials, NGOs, “transnational moral entrepreneurs,” and business 
entities are all part of “epistemic communities” that reach across national borders to entrench 
patterns of behavior and generate norms to solidify those patterns; state officials formalize the norms 
in international law and implement them in domestic law, but both public and private actors are 
involved in the interactions that lead to a later process of formalization and implementation). 
 Global legal pluralism, a recent contribution by Paul Schiff Berman and others, is in some ways a 
further development of the network and process accounts in that it concludes that the orthodox 
fixation on government regulators and territorial borders has outlived its usefulness and no longer 
serves as a helpful framework to craft responses to global problems.  See Paul Schiff Berman, Global 
Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1155–56 (2007) (“[I]nstead of trying to stifle conflict 
either through an imposition of sovereigntist, territorially-based prerogative or through universalist 
harmonization schemes, communities might sometimes seek . . . [to] manag[e], without 
eliminating, hybridity.”); see also PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM: A 
JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW BEYOND BORDERS 3–13 (2012) (asserting that regulation in the global 
space often crosses geographic boundaries, is characterized by significant hybridity, and includes 
many regimes that are wholly or partly nongovernmental).  Global legal pluralism rejects 
“sovereigntist territorialism” on the one hand, and “universalism” on the other, and instead uses 
procedural mechanisms as a way to solve hybridity problems.  BERMAN, supra, at 141. 
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Liberal theory, including the network and process accounts, provides helpful 
structures to explain the influence of non-state actors on state deciders.  But this 
literature has not yet attended to the specific role of business in treaty making, the 
effect of that role on the nature and success of treaties, and the appropriate legal 
rules that should govern that non-state behavior.101   
2. NGOs in the Spotlight 
The treaty literature has, however, devoted sustained attention to NGOs.102  
This literature addresses a number of conceptual and normative questions: To 
what extent does NGO involvement in treaty making affect traditional notions of 
state sovereignty?  Does NGO participation facilitate better international gov-
ernance, or serve to frustrate state action, and under what conditions?  Significant 
work in both law and social science has begun the challenging task of answering 
these questions.103  This literature sometimes includes business associations to-
  
101. See, e.g., Baradaran, supra note 42, at 747 (criticizing the compliance literature for “inappropriately 
concentrat[ing] on states”).  There is a growing new body of work that directs attention to the 
relationship between non-state actors and treaty compliance, see, e.g., id. at 749–51 (conducting 
empirical study to determine motivations that prompt individuals and firms to comply with 
international norms); Stephan, supra note 18 (providing a law and economics analysis); see generally 
Affolder, supra note 21, at 159 (demonstrating that corporations seek to comply with treaty law even 
when that law is directed to states and not private actors), but specific attention to business is needed.  
Paul Stephan has urged attention to business roles in a recent work in which he notes the growing 
privatization of international law and “the growing marginalization of the state” in its production.  
Stephan, supra note 18, at 1577, 1584 (collecting literature and asserting that “much of the 
production process can bypass states even if some state involvement may be essential at the time of 
application”).  This Article builds on Stephan’s work in that it responds to the same gaps in the law 
and literature.  However, the two projects vary in methodology and scope.  Stephan conducts a broad 
examination of the welfare effects of privatization of law production and enforcement by all types of 
non-state actor. 
102. For an overview of this extensive literature, see Charnovitz, supra note 56.  See also Raustiala & 
Bridgeman, supra note 35, at 3 (“NGOs—private, voluntary interest groups—are the most common 
and the most familiar [of nonstate actors].  Many analyses and discussions of nonstate actors are 
explicitly or implicitly limited to NGOs.”).  Charnovitz’s definition of NGOs excludes business 
actors.  NGOs are “groups of persons or of societies, freely created by private initiative, that pursue an 
interest in matters that cross or transcend national borders and are not profit seeking.”  Charnovitz, 
supra note 56, at 350.  However, according to Charnovitz, “[e]verything about nongovernmental 
organizations is contested, including the meaning of the term.”  Id. at 351; see also Raustiala & 
Bridgeman, supra note 35, at 3–4 (defining NGOs as “organized nonstate groups that seek to effect 
change [in policy],” but including both nonprofit interests groups such as the World Wide Fund for 
Nature and business and trade associations within that ambit, together with groups such as research 
organizations). 
103. See e.g., Brewster, supra note 97, at 502–03 (examining the influence of domestic interest-group 
demands on the U.S. government’s decision to engage in treaty agreements); Gráinne de Búrca et al., 
New Modes of Pluralist Global Governance, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 723, 723 (2013) (proposing 
a new mode of “experimentalist” global governance focused on collaboration, exchange, and 
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gether with NGOs within the analysis, though it often excludes them.104  To the 
extent business is included, the literature has yet to describe and evaluate their 
distinct and unique input and impact.105  
In particular, two important points are obscured by aggregating the diversity 
of actors involved in treaty making, and analyzing them together under a single 
“NGO” rubric.  First, not all NGOs that seek to participate in the international 
process are democratically governed, public-interest oriented nonprofits.  If the 
literature assumes that the archetypal NGO is Greenpeace, the conclusions it 
draws may be very different than if, for example, the ideal NGO is the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce.106  Moreover, some NGOs that appear to fall 
within the confines of a “democratically governed, public-interest-oriented, non-
profit” definition, are in fact substantially funded by businesses.107  As a result, lit-
erature that examines the legitimacy or effect of NGO participation without 
making distinctions between various kinds of NGO will be accordingly limited.108 
Second, as this Article shows in Part II, the market actors excluded by tra-
ditional analyses of NGO behavior are not absent in the treatymaking process.  
Rather, they are present, but flying under the radar, since their channels of influ-
ence are not as well known or studied.  The literature on non-state roles in treaty 
making thus builds a foundation for, but does not identify or address, a crucial 
new area of study: Is business involvement in formal international lawmaking 
unique?  And how does that involvement affect the resulting treaties?  Does 
  
nonhierarchical decision making between states and civil society actors); David Gartner, Beyond the 
Monopoly of States, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 595, 598 (2010) (summarizing and evaluating “theoretical 
objections raised by scholars to the inclusion of civil society actors in the governance of international 
institutions”: concerns with NGOs include accountability, representativeness, overrepresentation of 
voices from the global North, legitimacy, and weakening of the influence of states); Stephan, supra 
note 18 (examining effects of nonstate participation in law production).  Nevertheless, Peter Spiro 
points out that the role of NGOs in international lawmaking “remains under-theorized.”  See Peter J. 
Spiro, NGOs and Human Rights: Channels of Power 1 (Temple University Legal Studies Research 
Paper Series, Research Paper No. 2009-6, 2009). 
104. See, e.g., Raustiala & Bridgeman, supra note 35, at 4 (including business and trade associations in the 
general definition of NGOs, but noting that this definition is out of step with the bulk of the 
literature on NGOs); Charnovitz, supra note 56, at 350 (“Although profit-seeking business entities 
are not NGOs, associations of business entities can be, such as the International Chamber of 
Commerce.”). 
105. See, e.g., Raustiala & Birdgeman, supra note 35, at 3–4 (including business and trade associations in 
the general definition of NGOs rather than analyzing business contributions separately). 
106. Cf. Gartner, supra note 103, at 600–06 (collecting critiques of NGO participation in the lawmaking 
process such as representativeness, accountability, and disruption of State sovereignty). 
107. See note 76 and accompanying text. 
108. For further analysis of these points, see Melissa J. Durkee, “Astroturf Activism’). 
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business involvement lead to better, worse, stronger, more costly, or less legiti-
mate treaties, and how should international law rules develop in response?109 
3. The Work That Remains 
The scholarship that attends to business roles in international law once 
again follows the legal architecture: Since, under traditional conceptions, busi-
nesses do not make law, the most sustained scholarly focus has been on ways that 
business actors wield state authority derivatively, or form nonbinding norms.110  
In particular, literatures have focused attention on new forms of governance oper-
ating outside the treaty system, and on business roles in setting standards that are 
later adopted into treaty regimes.  
For example, one of the core aims of a very significant scholarly project over 
the past two decades—the Global Administrative Law Project111—is to ferret out 
forms of administration that are not just public, but also private or public-private 
hybrids.112  Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, and Richard Stewart, together with 
other scholars working in this field, have discerned that a body of legal rules and 
processes—similar to domestic administrative law—has spread across numerous 
institutions on the international stage, and that in this “administrative” space, 
both public and private actors have roles in the administration of law.113  In the 
private category, the Global Administrative Law Project highlights, for example 
  
109. For a parallel project, see Roberts & Sivakumaran, supra note 14 (surveying current ways armed 
groups participate in lawmaking and arguing for an expanded role). 
110. This is not to say that the role of business in the production of international treaties has received no 
attention.  For example, Gregory Shaffer has identified two main “mechanisms through which 
business shapes law,” one of which is “influencing the public institutions that make and apply law,” 
including treaty law.  Gregory Shaffer, How Business Shapes Law: A Socio-Legal Framework, 42 
CONN. L. REV. 147, 147 (2009).  In addition John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos have conducted a 
supremely comprehensive qualitative empirical study of business influence in global business 
regulation, though their study does not focus specifically on treaties or analyze the impact of this 
business influence on the features of treaty regimes.  See BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 75 
(concluding that businesses play many roles in the globalization of regulation including “shap[ing] 
the actions of states and international organizations”).  See also infra notes 120 to 123 and associated 
text (identifying an incipient literature addressing business roles in formal lawmaking). 
111. See http://www.iilj.org/gal (collecting papers). 
112. See Kingsbury et al., supra note 17.  Other scholars who do not self-identify as part of the global 
administrative law project are pursuing similar projects.  See, e.g., VIRGINIA HAUFLER, A PUBLIC 
ROLE FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR: INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 
(2001); see also BÜTHE & MATTLI, supra note 17 (describing a variety of areas where private 
standards are incorporated into international law); Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, 
Strengthening International Regulation Through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the 
Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 501 (2009) (describing and advocating a 
transnationally linked and voluntarily promulgated system of regulatory norms). 
113. See Kingsbury et al., supra note 17, at 18–19, 21. 
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the parallel roles of the International Standards Organization, a private organiza-
tion that harmonizes product and process rules; NGOs that have set up standards 
and certification regimes for internationally traded products, such as fair-trade 
coffee; and business organizations that have set up regulatory regimes for their 
own industries, such as Fair Labor Association standards for sports apparel.114  
Thus, one of the Global Administrative Law Project’s most significant contribu-
tions is the important insight that both public and private actors have roles in the 
administration of international law.  Just as international law increasingly reaches 
inward to govern the private sector, so too does the private sector increasingly 
find ways to influence the administration of the laws to which it is subject.115   
Yet the Global Administrative Law Project literature for the most part cab-
ins its reach to exclude traditional international lawmaking.  Global administra-
tive law is administrative in that it constitutes rulemaking, administrative 
adjudication, and other forms of regulatory management that “operate below the 
level of . . . treaty-making”; the project distinguishes this activity from “legisla-
tion[,] in the form of treaties.”116   
Related projects have viewed the private sector as lawmakers operating 
“below the level of . . . treaty-making” in a different way:  Business entities 
self-regulate by engaging in regulatory arbitrage; by setting up governance re-
gimes in under-regulated spaces such as their own supply chains;117 or by engag-
ing in “bottom-up lawmaking” by developing practices that over time evolve into 
“law that is just as real and just as effective, if not more effective, as the treaties 
that initiate the top-down process.”118  Others have extended the insights of the 
Global Administrative Law project by noting that privately created standards 
  
114. Id. at 22–23.  In the public-private hybrid space, the Global Administrative Law Project highlights 
the role of international bodies such as the Codex Alimentarius Commission, which sets food safety 
standards through a decision process that includes representatives from both the government and the 
private sector; or ICANN, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, a once-
private body that has come to include governmental representatives as well.  See id. at 22. 
115. Id. at 22–23; see also; Karsten Nowrot, Transnational Corporations as Steering Subjects in International 
Economic Law: Two Competing Visions of the Future?, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 803, 803 
(2011) (asserting that transnational corporations are political actors who are increasingly involved in 
the progressive development and enforcement of economic law, specifically the WTO and foreign 
investment regime). 
116. Kingsbury, supra note 17, at 17 (emphasis added). 
117. Id.; see also Backer, supra note 45, at 762–72 (noting that businesses self-regulate through regulatory 
arbitrage, and also self-regulate through creating rules for their supply chains); Kishanthi Parella, 
Outsourcing Corporate Accountablity, 89 WASH. L. REV. 747, 753, 755–56 (2014) (noting that 
corporations are increasingly responsible for regulating throughout their “global value chains”). 
118. Janet Koven Levit, Bottom-up Approach to International Lawmaking: The Tale of Three Trade 
Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 125 (2005). 
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become codified in formal treaty law.119  While helpful in unearthing significant 
private roles in public governance, these projects do not set their sights on exca-
vating and evaluating business roles in formal international treaty making. 
There is some direct work on business roles in treaty making, upon which 
this project builds.  For instance, there has been significant analysis of the Interna-
tional Labor Organization’s unique structure, in particular business contribu-
tions to ILO lawmaking.120  Commentators evaluating non-state participation 
in environmental treaties frequently examine business roles alongside the roles of 
other participants, like traditional NGOs.121  Now, with ongoing work toward 
forming a new treaty governing business responsibilities for human rights, 
popular commentators are grappling with how to structure business participa-
tion in that project.122  These responses are, thus far, ad hoc and treaty-specific.   
While there is no comprehensive approach, the connection between busi-
ness participation in treaty regimes and state compliance is the subject of an in-
cipient literature.  In a previous work, I examined the necessity of business buy-in 
for the success of a category of treaties I call “persuasion” treaties.123  Shima Bara-
daran and her coauthors have conducted a substantial empirical analysis examin-
ing motivations for private compliance with treaties, and drawing connections 
between individual and state compliance.124  The social science literature has ana-
lyzed lobbying through a public choice lens.125  Finally, Natasha Affolder has 
studied the way businesses appropriate treaty texts for their own ends.126  These 
works demonstrate the growing awareness in the literature that business activity 
matters to international treaty making.  It is time for more knowledge and a more 
systematic response. The work that remains is to identify the structural gaps that 
  
119. See e.g., Wagner, Regulatory Space, supra note 83 (describing mechanism whereby the SPS 
Agreement incorporates privately elaborated standards). 
120. See Raustiala, supra note 23, at 158. 
121. See, e.g., Chiara Giorgetti, From Rio to Kyoto: A Study of the Involvement of Non-Governmental 
Organizations in the Negotiations on Climate Change, 7 N.Y.U. ENVT’L L.J. 201, 202 (1999); Chiara 
Giorgetti, The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations in the Climate Change Negotiations, 9 COLO. J. 
INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 115, 116 (1998); Raustiala & Bridgeman, supra note 35, at 8–11. 
122. See, e.g., Jens Martens, Corporate Influence on the Business and Human Rights Agenda of the United 
Nations (Glob. Policy Forum Working Paper, 2014), http://www.misereor.org/fileadmin/redaktion 
/Corporate_Influence_on_the_Business_and_Human_Rights_Agenda.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/64ZN-7TMW]. 
123. See Durkee, supra note 8. 
124. Baradaran et al., supra note 42, at 747–51. 
125. See generally, Brewster, supra note 97; BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 75. 
126. Affolder, supra note 21, at 159 (demonstrating that “corporations are consumers of treaty law,” and 
explaining how the “[g]rowing pressure to define acceptable standards of environmental and social 
behavior for companies is creating a robust market for ‘international standards.’”). 
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leave private participation unregulated, and to address whether and how interna-
tional law should develop a comprehensive response. 
*      *      * 
This Part has implicitly asked the reader to defer two separate sets of ques-
tions.  The first set is descriptive: What exactly is meant by business participation 
in treaty making?  What kind of business actors are involved and what is the 
mechanism of their participation?  The second set is normative: What kind of re-
sponse is needed?  Are new legal structures needed, and if so, on what theory?  
The following Parts take these questions in turn.  
II. THE BUSINESS OF TREATIES 
Market actors are, in fact, deeply embedded in the making of internation-
al treaties, notwithstanding both the state-centric orthodoxy of the international 
system and the lack of any formal regime to facilitate or restrain their participation.  
Business participation is not limited to the anomalous patchwork of roles sur-
veyed in Part I.A, such as accreditation to particular environmental treaties, or 
development of standards for later adoption into treaties by reference.  Rather, as 
the examples that follow show, business roles in treaty making can be both exten-
sive and quite varied. 
This Part surveys the lawmaking processes that produced two private-law 
treaties—the Cape Town Convention and the Rotterdam Rules.127  The two ex-
amples show that, for some treaties, business is involved at all relevant generative 
points: design; drafting; negotiation and adoption; ratification and implementa-
tion; and enforcement.  In addition to typologizing business participation in the 
two private-law treaties, this Part also shows the breadth of business participation 
by using popular and academic responses to the Trans-Pacific Partnership as a 
shadow example.128  This final example demonstrates that business participation 
extends far beyond the private-law arena and implicates treaties in which im-
portant public interests are at stake, presenting additional normative complexi-
ties. 
  
127. Private law treaties regulate private relationships across national borders.  Some prominent examples 
include the Hague Service Convention, see Convention of 15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad 
of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 658 
U.N.T.S. 163, 20 U.S.T. 361, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=17 
[http://perma.cc/Y9HU-KJCM], and the CISG, see United Nations Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods 1489, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 163, http://www.uncitral.org/ 
uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG.html  [http://perma.cc/VWW8-HH5W]. 
128. See generally Overview of the Trans Pacific Partnership, OFF. U.S. TRADE REP., https://ustr.gov/tpp/ 
overview-of-the-TPP [http://perma.cc/X7GF-7NUP] (describing the Trans-Pacific Partnership as 
an “ambitious, next-generation, Asia-Pacific trade agreement”). 
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A. The Cape Town Convention 
1. Background 
The Cape Town Convention has been hailed as perhaps “the most signifi-
cant piece of private international law in recent history.”129  The Convention fa-
cilitates financing of mobile equipment such as aircraft, spacecraft, and railway 
cars.130  A bit of background information will frame the issues, clarify the stakes, 
and demonstrate the significance of business involvement.  The normal rule is 
that financing is governed by the domestic legal regimes in which the goods to be 
financed are located.  It turns out that these default rules are quite varied.  Priority 
rules, substantive remedies, and the timeframe in which remedies may be granted 
vary substantially between different jurisdictions. 
Before the Cape Town Convention, financing of mobile equipment was 
subject to the domestic laws of the state where the goods were located.  This was 
consistent with financing rules for other goods, but mobile goods presented par-
ticular challenges because the equipment could be anywhere in the world at the 
time of default.131  In other words, finance of mobile equipment like aircraft is a 
unique area because the equipment is just that: mobile.  Say that the mobile 
equipment in question, such as a Boeing airplane, came to rest in Country X.  
Under the laws of Country X, would the investor’s loan have priority over other 
interests?  Would the investor be able to auction the equipment and pocket the 
proceeds in satisfaction of the debt?  Before the Convention, because investors 
were subject to the domestic laws of the regime in which the aircraft was located, 
they suffered the uncertainty of not knowing up front—at the time of making the 
initial financing contract—what rules would attach at the time of default.132  
Thus, as a result of the peculiar challenges that mobile equipment presented, and 
the indeterminate nature of the patchwork of national laws, financing was diffi-
cult to obtain and relatively costly.133  The primary investors in mobile equipment 
  
129. Sandeep Gopalan, Comment, Harmonization of Commercial Law: Lessons From the Cape Town 
Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, 9 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 255, 255 (2003). 
130. See Mark J. Sundahl, The “Cape Town Approach”: A New Method of Making International Law, 44 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 339, 341, 344 (2006) (noting that the Cape Town Convention takes its 
place among a number of efforts in a “long-standing movement to create a modern and uniform 
international law of secured transactions”). 
131. See Goode, supra note 5, at 600–01. 
132. See Sundahl, supra note 130, at 345 (offering general background on default rules in security 
interests law). 
133. See id.; see also Gopalan, supra note 129, at 261. 
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were highly specialized investors who were comfortable investing in this niche 
market.134 
The Cape Town Convention was meant to open up the niche mobile 
equipment investment arena to nonspecialist investors, including investment 
funds and insurance companies, that needed a greater amount of predictability.135  
The Cape Town Convention sought to remedy the indeterminacy problem by 
prescribing internationally standardized rules.  The rules govern priority of inter-
ests and enforcement, and supplant national laws.136  This is a particularly striking 
result because most domestic regimes have priority and enforcement rules that are 
generally consistent across investment type.137  The Cape Town Convention 
changed those national priority rules only with respect to one particular kind of 
security interest: the interest in high-value mobile equipment such as aircraft, 
spacecraft, and railway equipment.138  Finally, in addition to providing priority 
and enforcement rules, the Convention attempts to cultivate the security and 
predictability that nonspecialists need by setting up an international registry, 
which provides a central clearinghouse available to anyone with interests in the 
relevant equipment.139 
By a variety of measures, the Cape Town Convention has been enormously 
successful.140  The Convention was adopted in late 2001, entered into force in 
January 2006, and has steadily acquired ratifications and accessions since then.141  
In late 2015, the number of state parties stood at a healthy sixty-eight.142 Before 
  
134. Most financial institutions, of course, are reluctant to extend loans without sufficiently determinate 
securitization.  According to Scott Scherer, Vice President and General Manager of aircraft financial 
services at Boeing Capital: “The lessons we learned from the US in the early 1990s were that legal 
rights to aircraft were ambiguous and . . . [produced] inefficiencies.”  Cape Town Revisited, 
AIRFINANCE J., (Dec. 2005), http://www.airfinancejournal.com/Article/2049784/CAPE-
TOWN-REVISITED.html [http://perma.cc/455D-APHZ]. 
135. See Sundahl, supra note 130, at 350–51. 
136. See Gopalan, supra note 129, at 259. 
137. Thus, for example, a house, an aircraft, and a Xerox machine will be subject to the same priority and 
enforcement rules.  In fact, most national rules do not distinguish between investment type at all, but 
simply set down the rules that apply to security interests in general. 
138. See Sundahl, supra note 130, at 341. 
139. See Roy Goode, The Cape Town Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment: A Driving 
Force for International Asset-Based Financing, 7 UNIF. L. REV. 3, 7 (2002) (commenting that priority 
follows a strict first-in-time registration rule and since the registry is available around the clock and 
world-wide, it offers all interest-holders equal opportunities to stake claims, and a clear indication of 
priority). 
140. Goode, supra note 5, at 605 (“There is no question that this vast effort has been crowned with 
success.  We now have a Convention and Protocols for all three categories of object.”). 
141. See Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, UNIDROIT, http://www.unidroit. 
org/status-2001capetown [http://perma.cc/B2K9-T3XB] (showing the Convention’s ratification 
status) (last visited Dec. 16, 2015). 
142. Id. 
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the Convention came into force, an economic impact assessment performed by 
both INSEAD in Paris, and the New York University Salomon Center, revealed 
that on conservative assumptions, the economic gains expected to result from the 
Convention and Aircraft Protocol “would run to several billion U.S. dollars a year 
and would be widely shared among airlines and manufacturers, their employees, 
suppliers, shareholders and customers, and the national economies in which they 
are located.”143 
2. Business Roles 
Industry actors had an extensive role in developing the Cape Town Con-
vention.  According to Ray Goode of Oxford University, “[i]t would not have 
been possible to bring such a major project to fruition without the active partici-
pation of the various industry sectors affected.”144  In particular, Goode asserts, 
the participation of Airbus Industrie and the Boeing Company “transformed the 
entire process.”145  Goode concludes that one of the main lessons to emerge from 
the generation of the Cape Town Convention was that, at least in the context of 
treaties such as the Cape Town Convention, in which private sector interests are 
at stake, “it is critically important to involve industry experts, and build[] up their 
support, from the very outset.”146 
Business actors were instrumental at all points in the development process 
of the Cape Town Convention: (i) determining the need for an international in-
strument in this area; (ii) drafting the text and designing the structure of the 
agreement; (iii) persuading governments to agree to the text and adopt the treaty; 
(iv) campaigning for ratification and assisting governments to implement the 
convention; and (v) funding the process. 
(i) Demanders.  At the outset, the private sector provided crucial input about 
whether there was a problem to be solved by a treaty in the first place.  The gov-
erning council of the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law 
  
143. Goode, supra note 5, at 604; Lorne S. Clark, The 2001 Cape Town Convention on International 
Interests in Mobile Equipment and Aircraft Equipment Protocol: Internationalising Asset-Based Financing 
Principles for the Acquisition of Aircraft and Engines, 69  J. AIR L. & COM. 3, 17 (2004) (stating that 
another measure of the Cape Town Convention’s success might be found in the fact that the 
Export-Import Bank of the United States “decided to lower the cost of acquisition of certain types of 
aircraft on the basis of reduced risk in connection with the Cape Town instruments” and the bank 
extended a discount—a reduction of its exposure fee by one-third—“on financing of large 
commercial aircraft to buyers in countries that sign, ratify and implement the Cape Town 
Convention”). 
144. Goode, supra note 5, at 606. 
145. Id. at 603. 
146. Id. at 606. 
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(UNIDROIT) had decided not to approve new private law treaties unless they 
were likely to receive “a substantial measure of support” from industry and other 
interested sectors.147  Accordingly, UNIDROIT sent out a detailed questionnaire 
to approximately one thousand private-sector actors, principally business and fi-
nancial institutions, to determine whether there were problems in the financing of 
mobile equipment that could be solved by a new convention.148  The Cape Town 
Convention project was only launched when UNIDROIT had received a suffi-
ciently affirmative answer to the question in the responses to those questionnaires. 
(ii) Drafters and Designers.  The business sector’s next substantial role was 
in drafting the text of the treaty.  In particular, Airbus Industrie and the Boe-
ing Company established an “Aviation Working Group,” which became “a 
great driving force in the project.”149  The Working Group assembled a series 
of detailed drafts of the Framework Convention and the Aircraft Protocol, which 
included extremely technical definitions of aircraft and aircraft engines.  Accord-
ing to the official drafters of the convention, these industry-generated drafts were 
of “inestimable value.”150  This was in part because the drafts incorporated tech-
nical expertise most readily available to those within the industry. 
In addition to preparing initial drafts of the convention, industry actors 
made crucial framing choices that relieved logjams in the drafting and negotiat-
ing process.151  Beyond providing technical expertise, industry actors proposed 
useful default remedies and priority rules, and designed the international regis-
try.152  Perhaps most significantly, Lorne Clark, the General Counsel of the 
International Air Transport Association (IATA) suggested a two-instrument 
approach including a framework convention and specific protocols that would 
cover each major form of mobile equipment (aircraft, rail equipment, and space-
craft) rather than incorporating all forms of mobile equipment in one treaty.153  
This had significant effects on the speed of the process and the clarity of the text.  
Moreover, Clark proposed a quite novel solution that departed substantially from 
the typical “framework convention plus protocol” approach familiar to interna-
tional treaty law.  Instead of using the framework convention to provide the 
ground rules, which the protocols would then develop with more specificity, 
  
147. Id. at 600. 
148. Gopalan, supra note 129, at 260 (“Approximately 1,000 copies of the questionnaire were sent with 
Professor Cuming’s report, typically to banks and financial institutions, confederations of industry, 
major industrial concerns, and airlines.”). 
149. Goode, supra note 5, at 603. 
150. Id. 
151. See Sundahl, supra note 130, at 354. 
152. Goode, supra note 5, at 603. 
153. See id. at 603–04. 
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Clark proposed the novel solution that the protocols should be permitted to 
modify and override the framework convention provisions.154 
(iii) Negotiators.  Industry, through the arm of the Aviation Working 
Group, then launched a “major campaign,” encouraging states to adopt the Con-
vention at the Cape Town Conference.”155  One of the major hurdles the agree-
ment faced was resistance from governments that were reluctant to accept an 
agreement that did not respect domestic traditions.156  Specifically, civil law 
countries were particularly interested in preserving a civil law approach, while 
common law countries advocated for common law norms.157  This divide was 
particularly significant because the Cape Town Convention was meant to sup-
plant domestic law rules for the kinds of security covered by the convention.158  
Thus, countries were asked to accept a departure from their domestic law priority 
and enforcement rules solely for mobile equipment.159  Countries from different 
legal traditions were skittish about accepting rules that were foreign to their legal 
culture, treating maintenance of legal culture as a point of pride and a sovereign 
right.160  Industry was particularly helpful in this regard, because it served as a 
neutral go-between, convincing states of the prudence of particular rules without 
serving as advocates for a particular legal culture—as state representatives would 
have been.161  Thus, industry representatives were quite effective at convincing re-
luctant national representatives to adopt a text mandating a set of laws that would 
depart in some respects from legal cultural norms.162 
(iv) Implementers.  According to Goode, “[t]he Aviation Working Group, 
aided by a substantial infusion of resources and manpower [from the Aviation in-
dustry] gave high priority to . . . implementation,” and “presented the case for rat-
ification to governments around the world.163  The Aviation Working Group and 
its industry supporters “showed its mettle,” at this stage of the process, campaign-
ing aggressively for ratification and implementation, and even going so far as to 
provide context-specific advice and best practices assistance to states.164 
  
154. See id. 
155. Id. at 606. 
156. Interview with Jeffrey Wool, Sec’y Gen., Aviation Working Group, in Seattle, Wash. (Aug. 2014). 
157. See Gopalan, supra note 129, at 258. 
158. See supra Part II.A. 
159. Id. 
160. Interview with Jeffrey Wool, supra note 156. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. 
163. Roy Goode, Transnational Commercial Law and the Influence of the Cape Town Convention and 
Aircraft Protocol, 50 CANADIAN BUS. L.J. 186, 210 (2011). 
164. Id. 
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(v) Funders.  Finally, and crucially, industry backers provided the funding to 
ensure the success of the project.  Industry funding paid for the services of lawyers 
who drafted the text, lobbied governments, set up the international registry, and 
set up mechanisms to monitor compliance.165  Industry funding also eased the fi-
nancial burden to South Africa of hosting the Cape Town Convention confer-
ence.166 
B. The Rotterdam Rules 
1. Background 
The Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods 
Wholly or Partly by Sea, better known as the “Rotterdam Rules,” is a new treaty, 
which opened for signature in 2009 and is not yet in force.167  The treaty seeks to 
solve an important maritime shipping problem.168  Prior international conventions 
exposed shippers to different contractual regimes depending on whether goods 
were transported by land or transported by sea.169  Thus, if a shipper were to chart 
a course for a given parcel of goods that included both a land leg and a connecting 
sea leg, that journey would require a separate set of contracts for each portion.170  
The lack of a unified regime created excess transaction costs, as each carrier was 
required to expend the time and resources to secure those separate contracts, and 
the disparate regimes created ambiguities and legal uncertainties.171  The Rotter-
dam Rules aim to offer a unified regime with a single set of contractual rules gov-
erning both carriage by land and sea, thus enabling shippers to conduct business 
under a single set of contracts for the entire journey.172  The intent, as the treaty’s 
website celebrates, is to “achieve uniformity of law in the field of maritime carriage 
  
165. See id. 
166. See id. 
167. G.A. Res. 63/122, supra note 4. 
168. María Angélica Uribe et al., Transport Facilitation From the Perspective of the Rotterdam Rules, FAL 
BULLETIN 1 (Nov. 2, 2010), http://www.cepal.org/Transporte/noticias/bolfall/7/42007/FAL-283-
WEB-ENG.pdf [http://perma.cc/35SD-66A4] (stating transport and logistics play a pivotal role in 
the competitiveness of globalized economies). 
169. Cf. New UN Convention Rotterdam Rules Open for Signatures, ROTTERDAM RULES, http://www. 
rotterdamrules2009.com/cms/index.php [http://perma.cc/V6CU-XSRV] (last visited Dec. 16, 
2015). 
170. See id. 
171. See id. 
172. See id. 
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. . . [and] provide for . . . door-to-door carriage.”173  One of the benefits of the new 
unified contractual regime is that responsibility for the goods—and thus liability 
for mishaps—will be clearly demarcated at all points in the transport process. 
In addition to stitching together the land and sea regimes, the Convention 
also aims to bring maritime shipping into the 21st century by facilitating e-
commerce, or electronic processing of maritime shipping contracts.  Treaty pro-
ponents anticipate that electronic processing will further reduce the time and 
transaction costs associated with maritime shipping, reduce errors, and increase 
the certainty and predictability of the entire process.174 
The Convention has been open for signature since fall of 2009, after it was 
endorsed by both UNCITRAL, and the United Nations General Assembly.  As 
of this writing, twenty-five countries have signed the convention, including the 
United States, France, Spain, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, and Denmark, 
among others.175  The current signatory countries account for over 25 percent of 
the current volume of international trade.176  However, to date only three countries 
have ratified the convention, which will only enter into force after the twentieth 
ratifying or other acceding instrument is filed.177 
2. Business Roles 
As with the Cape Town Convention, the business sector had a significant 
role in developing the Rotterdam Rules, though this role has attracted little atten-
tion in the academic and popular press.  In fact, the treaty’s official UN website is 
silent about the private input and instead emphasizes the roles played by tradition-
al intergovernmental negotiations and the United Nations.178 
  
173. Rotterdam Rules Signature Ceremony, ROTTERDAM RULES, http://www.rotterdamrules2009. 
com/cms/index.php?page=general-information [http://perma.cc/9L4G-4XUY] (last visited Dec. 
16, 2015). 
174. See Uribe, supra note 168, at 4 (“One of the essential principles of the Rotterdam Rules is the 
establishment of a globalized, uniform and modern regime for regulating the rights and obligations 
of stakeholders in the maritime industry, with a single contract of carriage from door to door.”). 
175. See United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by 
Sea, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND 
&mtdsg_no=XI-D-8&chapter=11&lang=en [http://perma.cc/K3RN-LHQQ] (last visited Dec. 
16, 2015). 
176. See id.; Cécile Legros, Relations Between the Rotterdam Rules and the Convention on the Carriage of 
Goods by Road, 36 TUL. MAR. L.J. 725, 726 (2012) (stating the first 24 countries that ratified the 
Rotterdam Rules represented 25 percent of the world’s trade). 
177. See United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by 
Sea, supra note 175. 
178. See New UN Convention Rotterdam Rules Open for Signatures, supra note 169 (“The Rotterdam Rules 
are the result of inter-governmental negotiations that took place between 2002 and 2009. These 
negotiations took place within the United Nations Commission for International Trade Law 
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This omission could be a result of the fact that business entities primarily in-
fluenced the development of the Rotterdam Rules through intermediary organi-
zations.  The direct role of any single business actor is thus less immediately 
apparent.  In fact, it is unclear whether any particular business actors principally 
drove the project forward.  This of course stands in contrast to the Cape Town 
Convention, where the entities principally responsible for the project were a small 
number of interested multinational corporations and the working group that they 
formed together.  Nevertheless, as in the Cape Town example, the principal actor 
in establishing the Rotterdam Rules was an organization that exists to further the 
interests of industry groups—here the Comité Maritime International (CMI).  
And the separate industry groups represented by CMI themselves took a proactive 
role in developing the instrument. 
As with the Cape Town Convention, business interests have been involved 
at all relevant generative points in the life of the Rotterdam Rules.  Specifically, 
business actors (i) determined a need for the instrument, and agreed among them-
selves as to the content of the instrument; (ii) enlisted an organization to draft the 
agreement; (iii) participated on delegations charged with negotiating the conven-
tion; (iv) urged and facilitated ratification; and (v) funded the conference in Rot-
terdam where the agreement was negotiated and signed. 
(i) Demanders.  In 2001, two major U.S. industry groups formulated a “joint 
statement” announcing that the entities had “agreed to pursue a common set of 
positions with respect to a new cargo liability regime for international ocean 
transport.”179  The two U.S.-based industry groups are the National Industrial 
Transportation League (NITL) and the World Shipping Council (WSC).  The 
World Shipping Council advertises itself as “a coordinated voice for the liner ship-
ping industry.”180  “The WSC and its member companies partner with govern-
ments and other stakeholders to collaborate on actionable solutions for some of 
  
(UNCITRAL), after the Comité Maritime International (CMI) had prepared a basic draft for the 
convention. On 11th December 2008, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the 
Rotterdam Rules.”). 
179. Joint Statement of Common Objectives on the Development of a New International Cargo Liability 
Instrument, NAT’L INDUS. TRANSP. LEAGUE & WORLD SHIPPING COUNCIL 1 (Sept. 25, 2001), 
http://www.worldshipping.org/pdf/jointstatement.pdf [http://perma.cc/77RB-MZVL] (reflecting 
unsigned agreement by Edward Emmett, President of the NITL and Christopher Koch, President 
of the WSC). 
180. Home, WORLD SHIPPING COUNCIL, http://www.worldshipping.org [http://perma.cc/P5RA-
LURE] (last visited Dec. 16, 2015) (“World Shipping council members operate approximately 90 
percent of the global liner ship capacity, providing approximately 400 regularly scheduled services 
linking the continents of the world.  Collectively, these services transport about 60 percent of the 
value of global seaborne trade, and more than US$ 4 trillion [sic] worth of goods annually.”). 
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the world’s most challenging transportation problems.”181  Similarly, the NITL is 
“The Shippers’ Voice Since 1907”182—an association of companies that conduct 
industrial and commercial shipping throughout the United States and interna-
tionally, representing six hundred member companies involved with transporting 
freight domestically and internationally.183  The mission of the NITL is “to ad-
vance the views of shippers on freight transportation issues.”184  In other words, the 
WSC and NITL are classic industry groups that exist to further the interests of 
their business members.  Together, they represent both ocean and land carriers.  
The joint statement produced by the groups reflected a negotiated agreement the 
two had made with each other to advocate for an international convention with 
specified terms. 
Specifically, the two parties agreed to work through the CMI and 
UNCITRAL to secure an international convention, advocating the positions 
they had negotiated with each other.  In fact, the parties built into their agree-
ment the assumption that CMI would forward a draft convention to 
UNCITRAL on a particular timeline, and that the countries negotiating the in-
strument would have it available for signature within three years.  They also 
agreed to “use best and timely efforts to have the U.S. government ratify the In-
strument and/or adopt implementing legislation” consistent with the agreements 
the two parties made to each other.185 
(ii) Drafters/Designers.  CMI then drafted the initial version of the Conven-
tion, closely tracking the joint statement by the two industry groups.  While CMI 
advertises itself as a “non-governmental not-for-profit international organi-
zation,”186 it is itself an industry player that exists to solely protect the interests of 
the shipping industry.  CMI was established in 1897 with the purpose of con-
tributing “by all appropriate means and activities to the unification of maritime 
law.”187  According to CMI’s constitution, the membership of CMI includes 
  
181. Id. 
182. Membership Center, NAT’L INDUS. TRANSP. LEAGUE, http://www.nitl.org/meminfo.asp [http:// 
perma.cc/NT9T-SK6V] (last visited Dec. 16, 2015). 
183. See NITL Applauds Broad Support for Rotterdam Rules, NITL NEWS (Oct. 2, 2009), http://www.nitl. 
org/NITL_RRule.pdf [http://perma.cc/CK99-VJJF]. 
184. Membership Center, supra note 182. 
185. Joint Statement on Common Objectives on the Development of a New International Cargo Liability 
Instrument, supra note 179, at 7. 
186. COMITÉ MAR. INT’L, http://www.comitemaritime.org/Home/0,271,1132,00.html [http:// 
perma.cc/Z5KU-7W4M] (last visited Dec. 16, 2015). 
187. Comité Maritime International Constitution, COMITÉ MAR. INT’L, art. 1, at 6, http://www. 
comitemaritime.org/Uploads/Yearbooks/1992%20YEARBOOK-ANNUAIRE.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/GF7A-8EFB]; see also Letter from Karl-Johan Gombrii, President, Comité 
Maritime Int’l, http://www.rotterdamrules2009.com/cms/images/CMI-letter-big.jpg [http://perma 
.cc/8JHW-6AE3] (“The CMI was established in 1897 and is the oldest international organization 
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national and multinational associations of individuals or business entities in-
volved in maritime activities or specialists in maritime law.188  In addition to 
those association members, CMI accepts international organizations “interested 
in the object[ive] of” CMI as nonvoting consultative members.189  Currently, 
CMI’s consultative membership includes twenty-one different organizations, 
such as the Arab Society of Maritime and Commercial Law, based out of Egypt, 
the International Association of Independent Tanker Owners, in London, the 
International Chamber of Commerce, the International Union of Marine In-
surance, based in Germany, and, of particular interest in this account, both the 
National Industrial Transportation League and the World Shipping Council.190 
According to the World Shipping Council, “[t]he new Rotterdam Rules 
convention contains most of the elements included in the agreement WSC en-
tered into with the [NITL] at the beginning of the UNCITRAL process.”191  In 
other words, at least according to the WSC, the draft of the Rotterdam Rules 
developed by CMI and sent on to UNCITRAL closely tracked the set of agree-
ments the WSC and NITL had made with each other, suggesting in an inferential 
way that those actors wielded considerable influence on the process. 
(iii) Negotiators.  The World Shipping Council itself then participated on 
the U.S. delegation to UNCITRAL throughout the negotiations.192 
(iv) Promoters.  CMI has a working group dedicated to promoting ratifi-
cation of maritime conventions, though it is not clear exactly what this group 
may have done to promote the Rotterdam Rules.193  In 2009, however, the In-
ternational Chamber of Commerce—another private sector organization rep-
resenting businesses all over the world—issued a statement in support of the 
new convention and asked governments to consider ratification based on a set 
  
concerned exclusively with maritime law and related commercial practice.  Our mandate is to strive 
for the unification of maritime law globally . . . .”). 
188. See Comité Maritime International Constitution, supra note 187, art. 3, at 6. 
189. See id. art. 3, para. e., at 8. 
190. See Consultative Members, COMITÉ MAR. INT’L, http://www.comitemaritime.org/Consultative-
Members/0,2776,17632,00.html [http://perma.cc/947X-BPEK] (last visited Dec. 16, 2015) 
(providing the complete list of consultative members). 
191. Collaboration, WORLD SHIPPING COUNCIL, http://www.worldshipping.org/industry-issues/cargo 
-liability/collaboration [http://perma.cc/4CVQ-RSDT] (last visited Dec. 16, 2015) (stating that 
“[t]his carrier-shipper alliance was extremely effective in helping shape the key issues during the 
negotiation”). 
192. See Industry Issues, WORLD SHIPPING COUNCIL, http://www.worldshipping.org/industry-issues 
[http://perma.cc/R4X5-Q67L] (last visited Dec. 16, 2015) (announcing on its website that it “has 
been working as part of the U.S. delegation to . . . [UNCITRAL] to achieve international cargo 
liability reform through the development of [the Rotterdam Rules]”). 
193. See COMITÉ MAR. INT’L, supra note 186. 
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of objectives important to international business.194  In addition, the WSC and 
the NITL issued a number of press releases celebrating various steps taken, in-
cluding the endorsement of the ICC, the signing at Rotterdam, and then subse-
quent signing by various countries, ratification, and so on.  
(v) Funders.  The Rotterdam conference itself was funded by “sponsor part-
ners,” including companies such as Argos Oil, Maersk Line, and Vopak.195 
C. Underexamined Others 
The two private law treaties examined above illustrate some basic features of 
business participation in treaty making.  In particular, they show the depth, varie-
ty, and mechanisms of industry participation.  But they illuminate only a small 
portion of what is likely a much larger picture.  The recent role of business in de-
veloping the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) demonstrates why business partic-
ipation in public law treaties heightens the stakes and urgency of the project.  It 
shows in an even starker fashion why better empirical understanding of business 
roles in treaty making is needed, together with a guiding theory and, almost cer-
tainly, coherent law. 
The possibility of business involvement in the public law arena raises the 
stakes for the project of developing a rational approach to business participation in 
treaty making because it raises the possibility—indeed, the likelihood—that market 
interests and public interests will not perfectly align.  It is one thing to accept, or 
even celebrate, the participation of business entities in crafting a law that principally 
regulates those same entities.  (Though even in the purely private law arena, it is of-
ten necessary for gatekeepers to ensure that various private interests are balanced in 
an appropriate way, and that the regime does not produce externalities that may 
harm the public interest.)  However, the proposition that business is involved in 
crafting public law—where it is involved in developing law for others—is likely to 
be much more controversial.  Yet business is involved in crafting public law.  A full 
discussion of the features and scope of this involvement is beyond the scope of this 
Article.196  Recent scholarly and popular attention to issues surrounding the devel-
  
194. Comments on the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by 
Sea, INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 1 (May 27, 2009), http://www.worldshipping.org/pdf/ 
uncitral_joint_statement.pdf [http://perma.cc/A7NC-U7W7] (stating that “the ICC asks 
governments to consider ratification of the convention”). 
195. Sponsor Partners, ROTTERDAM RULES, http://www.rotterdamrules2009.com/cms/index.php?page 
=sponsorships [http://perma.cc/ELW9-CNUV] (last visited Dec. 16, 2015). 
196. See supra notes 120–122 (noting that no systematic attention has been paid to business roles in public 
treaties but reviewing, inter alia, attention to business roles in treaty making in the environmental law 
arena; the adoption by public treaties of privately elaborated standards; and roles business should take 
in developing a Business and Human Rights Treaty). 
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opment of the TPP, however, illuminates both the preliminary point that business 
is involved, and the larger point that this involvement raises an important set of is-
sues that demand legal and scholarly attention. 
The TPP is a recently negotiated multilateral trade agreement that is, by 
some accounts, the largest-ever economic treaty.197  The parties to the treaty orbit 
the Pacific Ocean, and include Canada, the United States, Mexico, Peru, Chile, 
New Zealand, Australia, Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, Vietnam, and Japan.198  
The treaty is intended to enhance trade and investment between these parties, 
and projections show that it will govern transactions amounting to 40 percent of 
global gross domestic product.199  It is designed to eliminate tariffs on goods and 
services, reduce a host of nontariff barriers, and harmonize an array of regula-
tions.200  Many contentious issues, however, lurk among the regulations and non-
tariff barriers under scrutiny, particularly with respect to intellectual property and 
agricultural issues.201  Thus, global health advocates, environmentalists, Internet 
activists, and trade unions have deep concerns about the features of the deal.202 
The TPP demonstrates potential features of (and issues with) private sector 
participation in treaty making, in part due to the reaction that participation has 
produced.  Critics have expressed alarm at the depth of industry involvement in 
the treatymaking process, especially since that involvement has come in an envi-
ronment of deep secrecy.203  Critics observe that industry representatives who 
  
197. See Overview of the Trans Pacific Partnership, supra note 128. 
198. See id. 
199. Id. 
200. See Trade in Goods, OFF. U.S. TRADE REP., https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-chapter-chapter-negotiating-0 [https://perma.cc/384V-
CVNX] (last visited Dec. 16, 2015). 
201. See Carolina Rossini & Maira Sutton, What Is Wrong With the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), 
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug. 21, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/08/whats-
wrong-tpp [http://perma.cc/SJ9F-NPU6]; Maira Sutton, Secret TPP Negotiations—and Public 
Protests—to Be Held in New York City, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 23, 2015), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/01/secret-tpp-negotiations-and-public-protests-be-held-new-
york-city [http://perma.cc/ZN3H-6488]. 
202. See Emile Schepers, New Trans Pacific Trade Partnership Stirs Worries, PEOPLE’S WORLD (Nov. 14. 
2013), http://www.peoplesworld.org/new-trans-pacific-trade-partnership-stirs-worries [http:// 
perma.cc/UZT7-4R6C]. 
203. These critics come from all quarters, including academics, activists, and even senators.  As Senator 
Ron Wyden stated: 
[T]he majority of Congress is being kept in the dark as to the substance of the 
negotiations, while representatives of U.S. corporations—like Halliburton, Chevron, 
PHRMA, Comcast, and the Motion Picture Association of America—are being 
consulted and made privy to details of the agreement. 
. . .  More than two months after receiving the proper security credentials, my 
staff is still barred from viewing the details of the proposals that USTR is advancing. 
304 63 UCLA L. REV. 264 (2016) 
 
 
have a clear stake in the outcome have had front row seats to the treaty process, 
and have helped shape its terms—though the mechanisms of their participation 
are obscure.204  Advocates fear that the interests of industry actors like Monsanto 
and Philip Morris may be privileged at the expense of both the public205 and state 
sovereignty.206  Indeed, the U.S. public had little access to drafts of the TPP 
throughout the negotiating process, beyond secretive documents from Wik-
iLeaks.  And even members of Congress reported that they had very limited ac-
cess to treaty texts.207  Thus, one of the telling difficulties presented by the TPP is 
that because the negotiations were conducted in secrecy, it is difficult to find in-
formation about the precise nature and extent of industry’s role in the process.208  
But the lack of information itself points to a potential problem with private sector 
participation in public law treaty making: Transparency is a principal concern.  
Other potential concerns include the lack of public, nonindustry involvement, 
and the resulting democratic deficit.209  These concerns are motivated by, per-
haps, justified fears that industry involvement has privileged their interests with 
costs to a large number of public goods that are perceived to be under threat in the 
trade arena—including, access to generic medicine, climate and environmental 
regulations, job security in the manufacturing and service industries, and agricul-
tural standards.210 
  
We hear that the process by which TPP is being negotiated has been a model of 
transparency.  I disagree with that statement. 
 158 CONG. REC. S3517 (daily ed. May 23, 2012) (statement of Sen. Ron Wyden); See also 
Christina Bucci, Comment, Responsible Patent Protections: Preserving Public Health Objectives in the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, 26 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 213, 228-29 
(2013) (collecting responses); Jane Kelsey, Trans-Pacific Partnership Papers Remain Secret for Four 
Years After Deal, TPP WATCH (Oct. 16, 2011), http://tppwatch.org/2011/10/16/trans-pacific-
partnership-papers-remain-secret-for-four-years-after-deal [https://perma.cc/8PBR-Y5JE]. 
204. See Schepers, supra note 202. 
205. See Trans-Pacific Partnership Threatens a Regime of Corporate Global Governance, PROJ. CENSORED 
(Sept. 30, 2013), http://www.projectcensored.org/3-trans-pacific-partnership-threatens-regime-
corporate-global-governance [http://perma.cc/7WW7-Y3EP]. 
206. Id. (stating that the TPP “is actually an enforceable transfer of sovereignty from nations and their 
people to foreign corporations”). 
207. See id.; see also Rossini & Sutton, supra note 201. 
208. Cf. Trans-Pacific Partnership Threatens a Regime of Corporate Global Governance, supra note 205. 
209. Cf. Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 64 SMU L. REV. 975, 998–99 (2011) 
(identifying four public interest concerns that arose in the context of a recently negotiated intellectual 
property treaty, the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), which also featured “secret” 
negotiations: “(1) lack of transparency; (2) very limited public, non-industry participation; (3) a huge 
democratic deficit; and (4) virtually no domestic or global accountability”). 
210. See e.g., Joseph Stiglitz, On the Wrong Side of Globalization, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2014, 5:06 PM), 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/03/15/on-the-wrong-side-of-globalization/?ref=topics 
[http://perma.cc/3CHG-KN3M]. 
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Though the available information about the TPP has been limited 
throughout the negotiation process, it appears that industry participation is not 
as extensive as it was for the Cape Town Convention, where it served a crucial, 
perhaps controlling role at all points in the life-cycle of the treaty.211  In the TPP 
example, industry participation appears to be more akin to the role of traditional 
NGOs—consulting with governmental delegates during the negotiation process, 
and engaging in domestic regulatory capture.212  Thus, the TPP illustrates a sec-
ond (though admittedly not particularly deep) point: The depth of industry par-
ticipation in treaty making currently falls along a spectrum, with Cape Town on 
one end, a treaty with no private-sector participation at all on the other, and the 
TPP somewhere in the middle.  Most importantly, the TPP presents a contrast 
to Cape Town because it has not attracted the seemingly unvarnished approval 
Cape Town appears to enjoy.  Instead, critics worry that industry involvement in 
the TPP may demonstrate private sector involvement at its worst. 
* * * 
This Part has offered preliminary answers to the descriptive questions re-
vealed by the gap in international law and scholarship: How are business actors 
involved in treaty making?  More specifically, what kind of business actors are in-
volved?  What kinds of treaties attract private sector interest?  And what are the 
features of business participation?  A systematic answer to these questions—and a 
complete typology of forms of participation—would require sustained empirical 
analysis that is beyond the scope of this Article.  But case studies in this Part offer 
helpful kernels to guide that future analysis, and provoke consideration about 
whether an international legal response to business roles in treaty production is 
warranted, as Part III elaborates. 
Many of the features of business’s role in treaty making that have been in-
troduced in this Part are explored more fully in Part III.  One, however, is worth a 
preliminary note: Business entities are not deterred by lack of formal accredita-
tion.  They find ways to participate in treaty making even though they are exclud-
ed from the consultation regimes that apply to traditional NGOs.  Business 
entities do so by finding forms of participation outside of the formal conferences 
where accreditation is the ticket to entry.  As the examples show, they formulate 
and circulate their own proposed treaty texts; convince states to convene lawmak-
ing conferences on their own initiative; persuade domestic lawmakers to include 
  
211. See Part II.A. 
212. See Katrina Moberg, Private Industry’s Impact on U.S. Trade Law and International Intellectual 
Property Law: A Study of Post-TRIPS U.S. Bilateral Agreements and the Capture of the USTR, 96 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 228, 230 (2014) (discussing secrecy of TPP process and 
comparing Congress’s lack of access with the greater access by industry actors). 
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market actors as part of a state’s official treaty delegation; channel influence 
through nonprofit industry groups that qualify for the official accreditation 
regimes; circulate “best practices” to guide implementation; and lobby transnation-
ally to see that those practices are followed.  As the examples in this Part have 
demonstrated, for some treaties, business intervenes at all generative points in the 
lifecycle of a treaty. 
III. A CASE FOR VISIBILITY 
The absence of law that structures business participation in treaty making is 
problematic and calls for a response.  This Part argues that three kinds of responses 
are needed: empirical, theoretical, and legal.  To unpack this argument, this Part 
outlines the empirical analysis and theoretical choices that will be prerequisites to 
an appropriate legal response, and offers reasons why a legal response is likely 
desirable. 
Specifically, a legal regime regulating and guiding business participation in 
treaty making could improve the potential for treaties to function as effective 
lawmaking tools.  It could also deepen the legitimacy of treaty regimes.  It could 
improve certainty for both states and others affected by treaty law, such as busi-
ness actors.  Finally, at a broader level, the absence of a legal regime presents a 
timely and potentially fleeting opportunity to take a theoretically principled ap-
proach to shaping the relationship between states and business in lawmaking.213 
A. Effectiveness 
The first reason to pay attention to business roles in international treaty 
making is that regulating those roles could make treaties more effective.  Once 
lawmakers have a better understanding of the means and effect of business par-
ticipation in treaty making, they may regulate this participation in useful ways.  
Officials and onlookers know very little about how business participation impacts 
treaty outcomes.  More work is necessary to define and quantify business roles, 
and to better understand the relationship between business participation and 
treaty success, however these terms are defined and measured.  The examples of-
fered in the previous Part suggest that there is merit to the hypothesis that such a 
correlation exists, and that confirming this correlation and exploring its features 
  
213. Because business roles in international treaty making have not received the benefit of systematic 
scholarly attention, the purpose of this Subpart is to identify potential implications of that study and 
illustrate why it is urgently required.  Thus the proposals in this Part are meant to be illustrative and 
not comprehensive.  They invite—and lay a foundation for—more sustained scholarly analysis. 
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would be a productive avenue for further research. It would lead to a rich array of 
prescriptive implications, as this Subpart outlines.214 
Treaty success might be measured with respect to breadth of participation.  
How many states signed and ratified, or acceded?  Has the treaty entered into 
force?  Or treaty success might be a matter of process.  Was the treaty concluded 
after a process of reasoned deliberation in a manner that included relevant voices 
and advanced dignitarian values?  Or the measure of success could lie in the sub-
stance of the treaty.  Does the bargain balance the interests of diverse stakeholders?  
Does it contain meaningful measures that advance real solutions to international 
problems? Finally, the yardstick might be compliance.  Do parties abide by their 
promises?  These dimensions of success are illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
FIGURE 1.  DIMENSIONS OF TREATY SUCCESS 
 
The appropriate measure of success may relate to the particular kind of 
treaty under scrutiny.  For example, the chosen measure of success may be par-
ticipation or process when a treaty’s value lies principally in affirming a global 
commitment to certain aims rather than elaborating precise legal rules—
consider the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, or the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
as prime examples.  On the other hand, a treaty concerned with furthering an 
important global good that requires concrete forms of domestic implementation 
  
214. The proposals in this part elaborate and extend initial proposals by Stephan, supra note 18; see also 
STEPHEN TULLY, CORPORATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING 308–10 (2007) 
(collecting arguments for and against corporate contributions to international lawmaking). 
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may be counted as “successful” only if the substance of the treaty effectively ad-
dresses the problem and the treaty attracts compliance.  The Montreal Protocol 
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, and various free trade agreements 
such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, may fall into the latter 
category. 
As the examples in the previous Part illustrate, business roles in the trea-
tymaking process can affect treaty success along all these dimensions, in either 
beneficial or detrimental directions. 
1. Participation   
In the Cape Town Convention example, business actors were instrumental 
in lobbying domestically and transnationally before the treaty negotiation pro-
cess even began, in order to ensure that states would be amenable to adopting 
the text they proposed.  After the text was adopted, business actors were again 
active, engaging in a transnational process to persuade signing states to ratify, and 
additional states to accede to the treaty.  It appears that these efforts made a dif-
ference with respect to rates of ratification and accession.  Thus, if success is 
measured by participation rates, it is likely true that that business actors had a 
positive effect on the success of the Cape Town Convention.  It is less clear 
whether business actors had a similar effect in the context of the Rotterdam 
Rules, or will have such an effect in the context of the Trans-Pacific Partnership.  
It is possible to imagine a situation in which business roles have a detrimental ef-
fect on participation rates—for instance, if business were to lobby against a treaty 
in the same ways that it lobbied on behalf of the Cape Town Convention.  In 
sum, the Cape Town Convention example suggests that business can affect treaty 
success in either direction along the participatory dimension. 
2. Process   
The examples offered in this Article show that business actors may also have 
an impact on treaty success if success is measured in terms of the legitimacy (or 
perceived legitimacy) of the treatymaking process.215  Here, the Trans-Pacific 
  
215. Of course, legitimacy itself is “a term much invoked but little analyzed,” and defining the terms of the 
debate would be an important first step.  Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1789 (2005); see also SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN: THE 
SOCIAL BASES OF POLITICS 77 (1960), https://archive.org/stream/politicalmansoci00inlips#page/ 
76/mode/2up/search/engender+and+maintain [https://perma.cc/73PB-KCSZ] (“Legitimacy 
involves the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political 
institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society.”); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY 
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Partnership is the starkest example, since one persistent critique of the TPP pro-
cess is that the role business actors have been afforded is inappropriate, and that 
their input is privileged at the expense of public input.216  The Cape Town Con-
vention and Rotterdam Rules provide a counterexample, however, in that business 
actors enhance process legitimacy when they are the actors who are, or will be, the 
prime consumers of the law articulated in those treaties.  A critic concerned with 
whether a process is adequately deliberative may agree that participation by such 
stakeholders enhances the legitimacy of the lawmaking process. 
3. Substance   
Involving business actors in a treatymaking process could lead to better or 
worse bargains.  Again, a key critique of the TPP is that business involvement—
especially when married with an absence of public knowledge and input—raises 
the concern that business interests will be privileged at the expense of important 
public interests.  On the other hand, in the context of the Cape Town Conven-
tion, business involvement produced innovative, practical solutions such as the 
computerized global registry to be used to settle first-in-time disputes.  Busi-
ness participation also assisted states to overcome bargaining stalemates, such as 
the conflict over whether to incorporate rules from civil or common law tradi-
tions.  Thus, business participation may supply information, ideas, resources, 
and workable solutions.217  Business actors may also serve as facilitators, cutting 
through negotiating perseveration, and providing agenda guidance.  These fea-
tures of business participation could help states get to a better final product.  
The downside, of course, is that, left unchecked, business actors can also use 
their powers to frustrate important public goods.  In addition, more powerful 
business players could use their influence to choke out the interests of competi-
tors or other players.218 
  
THE LAW 26 (1990) (defining legitimacy by reference to “a conception of obligation to obey any 
commands an authority issues so long as that authority is acting within appropriate limits”); Tom R. 
Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME & JUST. 283, 307 
(2003) (“Legitimacy is the property that a rule or an authority has when others feel obligated to defer 
voluntarily.”); John C. Yoo, In Defense of the Court’s Legitimacy, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 776 (2001) 
(“Legitimacy is a word often used in our political debate, but seldom defined precisely.”). 
216. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
217. See also TULLY, supra note 214, at 307. 
218. See Roger Hailey, Questions of Balance in the Rotterdam Rules, ROTTERDAM RULES, 
http://www.rotterdamrules.com/sites/default/files/Questions-of-balance-in-the-Rotterdam-Rules-
Lloyd%27s-List-27-08-2009.pdf [http://perma.cc/G8NV-ZW4E] (last visited Dec. 16, 2015) 
(noting that critics assert that the Rotterdam Rules are weighed in favor of shipping carriers and 
biased against cargo owners because regime shifts liability to the cargo owners). 
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It is possible that the answer to the question of whether business participa-
tion helps or hurts the substance of a treaty bargain will depend on the extent to 
which business and public interests are aligned.  Private law treaties might fall on 
one end of the spectrum, where the interests of business and the international 
community are most fully aligned, and both benefit from business input.  The 
public benefit, in this instance, would be a beneficial outgrowth of industry bene-
fit, as in the Cape Town example.  On the other end of the spectrum would be 
treaties that are meant to further traditionally “public” interests, like those that 
require environmental regulations; here, business participation is at the most risk 
of disrupting publicly beneficial treaty outcomes.219  In between lie treaties that 
advance a mixed set of public and private interests and entail both the risks and 
benefits of coordinated participation.220  The Arms Trade Treaty, the Law of the 
Sea Treaty, the Energy Charter Treaty, and the TPP, as well as any future cyber-
law treaty, would likely fall in this category.   
4. Compliance   
Just as in the other three categories, business participation could cut for or 
against better treaty compliance.  On the one hand, involving key private sector 
stakeholders in treaty development could help persuade a state’s domestic con-
stituents to accept any future regulations the treaty may require, and thus smooth 
the way for more successful domestic implementation of treaty commitments.221  
This could, in turn, lead to better rates of compliance.  On the other hand, if pri-
vate sector participation leads states to abandon the regime because of legitimacy 
or deliberative deficits, that participation could harm compliance.222 
All of these questions require empirical scrutiny.  Empirical work could also 
examine whether business participates in different ways with respect to different 
treaty regimes.  It might be possible to simplify the data and find useful patterns 
by organizing the features of business participation according to type of treaty, 
and then tracing the effect of these patterns of influence according to the chosen 
  
219. See, e.g., Upendra D. Acharya, Globalization and Hegemony Shift: Are States Merely Agents of Corporate 
Capitalism?, 54 B.C. L. REV. 937, 937 (2013) (asserting that “the fall of the Soviet Union, the spread 
of technology, and the advent of multinational corporations have led to a new order wherein 
corporate capitalism has become a primary force in international law and states mostly serve 
corporate interests”). 
220. But there is a blurring between all of these categories.  The Cape Town convention affects ticket 
prices, human rights treaties help set a minimum standard that is beneficial to private actors, and 
more and more treaties fall into a middle category where they have the potential to advance a mixed 
set of public and private interests. 
221. This is one of the key arguments I make in Persuasion Treaties.  See Durkee, supra note 8. 
222. For a discussion of reasons motivating compliance, see Baradaran, supra note 42. 
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measures of success.  The payoff is meaningful enough to justify the significant 
scholarly effort this would require, as it would produce important guidance as to 
what kind of legal regime would most effectively encourage the beneficial aspects 
of business participation and restrain the detrimental ones. 
The argument of this Subpart is, in essence, that law could do more.  Once 
lawmakers understand the effect of business roles in treaty making sufficiently to 
craft appropriate legal rules, those rules could help produce more successful treaty 
outcomes along the four dimensions this Subpart has identified. 
B. Legitimacy 
A second reason to pay attention to business roles in international treaty 
making is that the existing legal regime is built on an outdated theory of account-
ability and legitimacy.  That outdated theory—identified as liberal theory in in-
ternational legal scholarship—begins from the premise that all actors besides the 
state itself channel their influence through state lawmakers.223  As a result, states 
may restrain business influence over international lawmaking by implementing 
domestic laws that protect state lawmakers from those business influencers.  This 
Article proposes that the theory is outdated because it has been outstripped by the 
facts—it does not account for the new ways international treaties are made. 
In the liberal theory account, state behavior internationally is the product of 
domestic interactions between individuals and groups.  Before bargaining on the 
international stage, states define their international preferences through domestic 
political processes.  As a corollary, domestic constituents use the nation-state as an 
instrument to accomplish their international goals.224  For example, assume the 
chemical company DuPont seeks to influence the scope of the Montreal Protocol 
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer by proposing that certain chemicals 
be included or excluded, or that various provisions come into force on a certain 
timeline.  The liberal theory model assumes that DuPont would bring these pro-
posals to the attention of the international community by bringing them to the at-
tention of DuPont’s own domestic lawmakers—specifically U.S. officials. 
Because domestic interests are passed along to the international level via 
domestic legislative gatekeepers, domestic law can ensure that those gatekeepers 
remain accountable to their constituents.  Accordingly, in the United States, 
domestic laws require “sunlight” disclosures of lobbying activity; limit campaign 
  
223. See Peter J. Spiro, NGOs in International Environmental Lawmaking: Theoretical Models 2–3 (Temple 
University Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 2006-26, 2006), http://ssrn. 
com/abstract=937992 [http://perma.cc/ZS8C-8AWQ]. 
224. See, e.g., Brewster, supra note 97, at 502–03. 
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contributions and other gifts to regulators; and restrain the flow through the 
“revolving door” between legislators and lobbyists.225  These laws supplement 
and bolster the fundamental structural check on misuse of authority by legisla-
tors that is created by a system of democratic elections.  In our example, if offi-
cials act according to DuPont’s interests, DuPont can reward them with 
campaign contributions and other support.  Presumably, however, if a suffi-
ciently informed democratic citizenry disagrees with the choices DuPont has 
encouraged lawmakers to make, it will vote those lawmakers out of office.  So 
because international lawmakers are also domestic lawmakers, they are account-
able to domestic constituents through the domestic political process, and do-
mestic legal measures support and police that accountability. 
The liberal model, however, insufficiently describes the current situation 
because it does not account for two features of international lawmaking.  These 
features are described both broadly in the literature and narrowly with respect to 
business in the case studies in Part II.  First, business actors assert their interests 
transnationally as well as domestically.  Second, business participates directly in 
forming international treaties, outside of any domestic process and not mediated 
through domestic lawmakers. 
Transnational Actors.  The first point, that business actors assert their interests 
transnationally, is one I have made at greater length elsewhere.226  Here is the short 
version: One of the major contributions of network theorists like Anne Marie 
Slaughter and Harold Koh is the idea that private entities227 do not just influence 
their own domestic governments but they also network across national borders to 
influence officials in foreign governments as well.228  DuPont can directly lobby 
lawmakers in Europe, and it can work with foreign counterparts to bring pressure 
through foreign domestic lawmakers.  Business actors can also engage in regula-
tory arbitrage to exert leverage, since different countries have inconsistent legal 
regimes for holding lawmakers accountable and structuring non-state actor partic-
  
225. For a review of U.S. lobbying laws, see supra note 15; see also Richard Briffault, The Anxiety of 
Influence: The Evolving Regulation of Lobbying, 13 ELECTION L.J. 160, 160 (2014) (“Our legal 
system has long been of two minds about lobbying.  As far back as the Jacksonian Era, courts 
anxiously viewed the use of paid agents to influence government decision-making as a source of 
corruption.  Yet courts have also long recognized a legitimate interest in having professional 
assistance when trying to affect government.”). 
226. See Durkee, supra note 8 (examining transnational lobbying efforts in the context of European 
chemical regulations). 
227. See Koh supra note 100, at 2612 (including entities such as “moral entrepreneurs” and private 
business entities). 
228. See Durkee, supra note 8, at 84–85 (citing, inter alia, Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World 
Order, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 183, 184 (1997); Koh, supra note 100, at 2603; Harold Hongju Koh, 
Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 183–84 (1996)). 
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ipation in lawmaking.  The combination of transnational activity and inconsistent 
domestic regimes produces a situation in which lines of domestic accountability 
are attenuated and inconsistently policed. 
International Actors.  The second point is that business participates directly 
in the formulation of treaties.  Many decisions about the content of a treaty text 
are made before a domestic legislator’s ultimate choice about whether to ratify the 
text, and often even before a government’s treaty negotiator becomes involved.  
As the Cape Town Convention example illustrated with most clarity, business 
entities can act independently of state decisionmakers to formulate treaty texts; 
generate worldwide interest in a treaty governing a particular problem; negotiate 
with state decisionmakers; participate as delegates to treaty conferences; and a 
number of other direct lawmaking acts unmediated by domestically accountable 
gatekeepers.  To the extent that the United Nations or another international or-
ganization serves as the coordinating body, business actors can interact directly 
with those bodies.  This point was illustrated in Part II.B. in the context of the 
Rotterdam Rules, specifically the industry group CMI’s relationship with 
UNCITRAL.  Of course, lines of accountability for those international officials 
reach back to domestic constituents only in a very attenuated fashion through the 
initial state delegation of authority.  On the whole, international officials are not 
subject to political expulsion on the grounds of capture.  Thus, to the extent that 
business actors are interacting directly with those international officials, domestic 
laws that were developed to restrain capture of domestic officials are not sufficient 
to police the relationship. 
The international community has implicitly recognized the limitations of 
the liberal model, but has done so in an inconsistent way that ignores business 
roles.  In particular, the UN’s accreditation regime and others signal that the in-
ternational community has recognized the importance of some gatekeeping with 
respect to non-state actor participation in the treatymaking process.  But the 
principal United Nations accreditation regime is designed to exclude business ac-
tors, and most other accreditation regimes are patterned on this UN regime.  The 
fact that business is nevertheless participating, both through accredited NGOs 
and by alternate channels, suggest that this partial accommodation is outdated 
and merits rethinking as well.229  One possible response would be to erect a paral-
lel accreditation regime designed specifically for business actors. 
  
229. In the U.S. domestic arena, nonprofit lobbying is highly regulated.  A nonprofit may not make 
lobbying “a substantial part” of its activities, and risks excess taxes and revocation of their tax-exempt 
status if it does.  See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.501(c)(3)-1; (c)(3)-1(b)(B)(ii–iv) (stating that in order for an 
organization to maintain its tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3), no substantial part of its activities 
may include the carrying on of propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation); Treas. 
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Finally, the strong form of this argument is not required to justify more le-
gal and academic attention to the problem of business participation in treaties.  
Further scholarly work could produce the conclusion that the domestic law is 
sufficient to police accountability and legitimacy.  Even so, the question persists 
in another form: Are the existing domestic regulations—developed in the con-
text of domestic lawmaking—sufficient to properly structure business roles in 
international treaty making?  What additional domestic law is needed? 
C. Efficiency 
The third reason to pay attention to business roles in international treaty 
making is that the current regime lacks certainty and predictability.  Not only 
are the values of certainty and predictability fundamental to the rule of law in 
general,230 they are particularly important in the context of regulating business 
behavior.231  Legal certainty helps business actors plan their activities without 
fear of interference.232  As Peter Spiro notes, “[c]orporations hate being regulat-
ed, but they hate uncertainty more.”233  In Spiro’s account, public regulation is 
“self-entrenching and less vulnerable to the sort of competitive displacement 
that can undermine private schemes.”234  Public regulation can also benefit 
businesses because it levels the playing field, evening out burdens between the 
  
Reg. § 1.501(h) (stating that if § 501(h) election is made, “no substantial part” is determined by an 
expenditure test for both direct and grassroots lobbying).  This U.S. domestic regime is a fascinating 
inversion of the international arena where nonprofits are one of a few non-state actors officially 
permitted to lobby lawmakers through the UN accreditation regime and the other regimes that 
follow the UN model.  See supra Part I.A.2. and accompanying notes.  The distinction may arise in 
part from the U.S. government’s desire not to subsidize lobbying by nonprofits through tax-exempt 
status, where no such regime exists internationally. 
230. For general discussions of rule of law values, see, for example, BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE 
RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY(2004); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as 
a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 51 (1997); Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law 
and Its Virtue, 93 L.Q. REV. 195–202 (1997) reprinted in JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: 
ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY (1979).  For a basic review of this fundamental point, see 
Lawrence B. Slolum, Legal Theory Lexicon 017: The Rule of Law, LEGAL THEORY LEXICON, 
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/01/legal_theory_le_3.html 
[http://perma.cc/H87R-TWRG] (last visited Dec. 16, 2015). 
231. Anthony D’Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 5 (1983) (“[L]egal certainty is necessary 
for capitalist progress.”) (citing MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 883 (G. Roth & R. 
Wittich eds., 1968)); Irina Sivachenko, Corporate Victims of “Victimless Crime”: How the FCPA’S 
Statutory Ambiguity, Coupled With Strict Liability, Hurts Businesses and Discourages Compliance, 54 
B.C. L. REV. 393, 395, 411–12 (2013) (explaining that businesses dislike and are often injured by 
ambiguous laws and insufficient legal guidance). 
232. See Peter J. Spiro, supra note 217 (“Corporations abhor uncertainty.”). 
233. Peter J. Spiro, Constraining Global Corporate Power: A Short Introduction, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 1101, 1118 (2013). 
234. Id. 
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“big, visible corporations” that are more often targeted for public and regulatory 
scrutiny, and everyone else.235  The general point extends to business roles in trea-
ty making: Business actors are served by knowing in advance how they may ad-
vance their interests, and they are also served by the kind of regulatory stability 
that is furthered by effective treaty regimes.236 
States individually, and the international community as a whole, may bene-
fit from legal certainty as well.  As Anthony D’Amato has argued, “uncertain law 
may deter activity that the state wants to encourage.”237  In the case of treaty mak-
ing, the state (or the international community of states) may want to encourage 
business actors to channel their influence in a transparent fashion rather than 
through secretive meetings with treaty decisionmakers, or by funding NGOs 
who can receive official accreditation and then serve as mouthpieces to advance 
business aims.238  Conversely, a state, or the community of states, may want to 
encourage business actors to take a more robust role in forming treaties, for ex-
ample by offering the kind of industry data, best practices, and other expertise 
that will help states develop the most effective treaties.239 
Certainty and predictability also benefit the international regime because 
they foster efficiency.  Without laws, standards, or set guidelines structuring the 
treatymaking relationship between states and business entities, international de-
cisionmakers must design these procedures anew whenever they engage in law 
making, a process that could itself produce contestation.  The necessity of devel-
oping procedure—in addition to substance—taxes additional lawmaking re-
sources.  This problem is on display currently in the context of a newly proposed 
treaty regulating business and human rights.240  Before developing the content of 
  
235. Id. 
236. Id. For example, Lawrence Susskind, writing in a business journal, urges business to “play an active 
role in promoting the most useful reforms” of the international treatymaking system in order “to 
achieve greater uniformity, predictability and efficiency,” which can lead to greater global regulatory 
certainty in the environmental law context.  Susskind, supra note 21, at 71; see also Affolder, supra 
note 21, at 521–22 (observing that business entities use treaty texts for their own purposes; for 
example, even if business actors do not bear rights or responsibilities under a particular treaty regime, 
they may use that regime as the best available articulation of a regulatory standard, in order to 
demonstrate that their conduct is acceptable even in absence of an applicable legal rule). 
237. D’Amato, supra note 231 at 5 (1983) (“If rules relating to sales, commercial paper, negotiable 
instruments, deeds, wills, and the like approach the 0.5 level of complete uncertainty, the underlying 
commercial activities will be deterred if not stifled.”). 
238. See supra note 76 and accompanying discussion; see also Fri, supra note 76, (recommending that 
corporations participate in the international treatymaking process by forming or funding NGOs). 
239. See Susskind, supra note 21, at 69 (reviewing a “Salzburg Initiative” proposal which concludes, inter 
alia, that “[a]n International League of NGOs should review relevant scientific, technical and legal 
material in advance of full conference negotiations”).  This is a very real issue in the context of the 
private law treaties surveyed in Part II.A–II.B, since states must construct workable rules. 
240. See Interview with Anita Ramasastry, supra note 22. 
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the treaty, treaty designers must expend time and other resources developing an 
approach to obtaining input from business actors.  Will they formulate an ac-
creditation regime for business?  If so, how should such a regime be designed?  
This preliminary set of questions is currently requiring considerable negotiation 
and discussion and requires answers before treatymakers can move on to gener-
ating the content of the treaty rules.  Thus, a legal regime—or even a soft law 
blueprint—that elaborates set procedures defining the treatymaking relationship 
between states and business entities could help foster certainty and predictability 
for both state and business actors.  It could facilitate, in addition to other goods, 
a more efficient treaty negotiation process. 
D. Coherence 
The fourth reason to pay attention to business roles in international trea-
ty making is that the absence of law presents a unique opportunity to select a 
theoretically coherent approach and apply it prospectively.241  The opportunity 
is not only to make laws that are systematic rather than ad hoc, but also princi-
pled rather than reactive.  And that opportunity is likely fleeting. 
Two theoretic models present themselves as plausible candidates, worthy 
of further scrutiny and development.  I will call the first an “administrative” 
model, and the second a “market” model.242  The essential difference between 
the two is that the administrative model preserves an essential dichotomy be-
tween public and private actors.  By contrast, the “market” model would view 
the various participants in the treatymaking process as equal stakeholders.243  
The two models are meant to function as ideal types, or pure analytic catego-
ries.  An actual legal model or set of legal structures would likely fall somewhere 
on a spectrum between these pure models, taking on some features of both.   
Administrative Model.  The focus of the administrative model is on struc-
turing and restraining private participation in what is conceived of as a princi-
pally public lawmaking function.  Domestic U.S. administrative law 
  
241. The opportunity to develop a theoretically coherent legal architecture is in addition to the two other 
kinds of opportunities surveyed previously in this Part: to use the law as a tool to increase the 
effectiveness of treaties (Part III.A), and to provide legal certainty and predictability for the benefit 
of both state and private actors (Part III.C).  While both of those articulations of the opportunity 
focus on the beneficial prospects of more law, this Subpart focuses on the why it would be beneficial 
to develop a coherent theory. 
242. A note at the outset: This conceptual framework is a vast oversimplification.  Because the coherence 
problem has not received systematic attention, however, even the basic framework illuminates 
important features of the public/private relationship and frames existing questions. 
243. This overall architecture builds on an important conceptual apparatus erected by Jody Freeman.  See 
Freeman, supra note 27. 
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scholarship provides a helpful guide.  For example, public interest theories 
conceive of administrative agencies as bodies of experts who should be insulat-
ed from the pressure of private actors so that they may apply their expertise 
undisturbed by the melee of politics and the market.244  Civic republican theo-
ries imagine a deliberative process in which private input is useful in order to 
enable decisionmakers to weigh various public goods in an informed way, but 
is ultimately not coupled with pressure.245  Pluralism advocates for a democra-
tized decisionmaking process that includes many different interest groups and 
produces rules through an essentially political process over which administra-
tive officials “simply preside.”246  Public choice theory builds on the central in-
sights of pluralism but imagines administrators as fundamentally subject to the 
desires of the private groups who capture those administrators, and then ex-
tract bargained-for “deals” through the administrative system.247  As Jody 
Freeman has pointed out, in each of these frames, administrative law theory 
responds to private roles by seeking to restrain their danger.248  Law follows 
theory, attempting to constrain private input in the administrative rulemaking 
process. 
International legal scholarship has borrowed fruitfully from administra-
tive models in other contexts.  As Part I.B. noted, the Global Administrative 
Law Project has undertaken a sweeping attempt to understand a varied set of 
international acts as forms of administrative governance, and to use adminis-
trative law tools to evaluate that behavior.  The lens would also be helpful in 
the context of crafting a structured relationship between state and non-state 
actors in treaty making.  It provides conceptual models by which to understand 
the relationship between the two kinds of actors and elaborates the legal choic-
es that flow from those models.  The principal question this model must con-
front is whether the public/private dichotomy is still fundamentally salient. 
Market Model.  The market model reassesses the old dichotomy between 
public and private decisionmakers in light of shifting balances of power.  The 
market model suggests that we should consider whether there is any value in 
maintaining the hierarchical formalism that privileges states as sole lawmakers 
and obscures the significance of non-state roles in the process.  In a situation in 
which the only role of states is to essentially rubber stamp a treaty presented by 
business actors, as was the case in the context of the Cape Town Convention, the 
  
244. See id. at 636–37. 
245. See id. at 637. 
246. Id. at 560. 
247. See id. at 561–62. 
248. See id. at 562–63. 
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traditional hierarchical structure of international lawmaking seems outdated.  Is 
this lawmaking really properly “public”?249  If so, its public nature would seem to 
persist in only the most formalistic sense.250 
The market model adapts to this changing reality by conceiving of states 
and private parties as equal stakeholders in a lawmaking process.  It would be 
patterned on contract principles rather than public law principles, and con-
ceived of in terms of private rather than public ordering.  One of the principal 
limitations of the market model is the fact that the state’s role as mediator is 
obsolete in this model, and so the question of accountability becomes most 
pressing.  To whom are business entities accountable, and what are the legal 
safeguards to mediate between public and private interests?  
The two models lead to divergent prescriptive implications.  Each has 
costs and benefits that warrant academic attention.  But the opportunity to 
choose a frame is exigent.  It is ripening because the extent of business in-
volvement in international lawmaking is coming into focus.  Both the depth of 
participation and its implications for international treaty making will likely in-
crease going forward.251  The opportunity is fleeting because both public and 
private parties will adopt practices that shape the global milieu going forward.  
The chance to set a theoretically principled course using legal tools will fall 
away as the system grows increasingly elaborate and entrenched.  Thus, inter-
national actors—lawyers, scholars, officials, and private entities—face a law-
making moment.  We can seize the opportunity to think prospectively about 
how to shape the relationship between states and non-state actors by choosing 
a guiding paradigm to structure future laws.  Or we can decline that oppor-
tunity and let the facts unfold as they will, with less predictable and possibly 
problematic results. 
E. Prescriptive Implications: The Tabula Rasa 
This Part makes a case for “visibility” because the argument is that business 
roles should not remain in the shadow of legal and scholarly neglect.  This argu-
  
249. See Stephan, supra note 18, at 1584 (noting that “much of the [law] production process can bypass 
states even if some state involvement may be essential at the time of application”). 
250. See id.; see generally Jose E. Alvarez, Are Corporations “Subjects” of International Law?, 9 SANTA 
CLARA J. OF INT’L L 1 (2010) (noting means by which corporations “make and enforce law,” and 
observing that the conclusion may be drawn that “only a formalist blind to reality would deny that 
they are ‘persons’ or ‘subjects’ of international law”); Jonathan I. Charney, Transnational Corporations 
and Developing Public International Law, DUKE L.J. 748 (1983) (asserting that while corporations 
should not have full international personality, they ought to be permitted to participate in the making 
of international law). 
251. See Stephan, supra note 18. 
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ment is both more and less ambitious than the basic assertion that more law is 
needed.  It is more ambitious because it calls for many types of response.  As this 
Article has asserted, business roles in treaty law should receive the benefit of em-
pirical scrutiny; scholars should choose and defend a theoretical model on which 
to elaborate a principled response; the relevant considerations include the “success” 
of a treaty by a number of different measures that this Article identifies; and the 
considerations also include certainty, predictability, accountability, and legitimacy.  
Thus, the argument is ambitious because each of the scholarly tasks it identifies is 
formidable.  But the argument is not so ambitious (or foolhardy) as to propose, at 
this early stage, what form a new law should take. 
It is a reasonable hypothesis that the scholarly tasks this Article has pro-
posed will lead to the conclusion that more law is required.  But that is not the 
only plausible conclusion.  Rather, there may be benefits to the current ad hoc, 
unregulated system.  After all, the current system is flexible enough to allow vari-
ous actors to adapt it to their own ends, as the examples in Part II demonstrate.  
This might be a desirable state of affairs for business actors.  It could also benefit 
the international system and the public goods it seeks to protect.  This is because 
the unregulated space could lead to innovation and creativity—a flowering of dif-
ferent lawmaking forms.  In the United States, this kind of experimentation is 
celebrated as scholars and lawmakers draw learning from a “laboratory of states.” 
Business actors might contribute productively to this creative process, as they did 
in the Cape Town example, by breaking logjams,252 and contributing innovative 
new lawmaking tools.253  But, as this Article has also argued, the ad hoc, unregu-
lated space may also contribute to treaty failings, by making the process slow and 
cumbersome, and burdening parties with fashioning and agreeing on procedural 
rules as well as substantive rules for every new treatymaking effort. 
Assuming further study confirms the hypothesis that law is needed—a stable 
and systematic legal regime that governs the treatymaking relationship between 
business and state actors—there are a number of forms this law could take.  One 
possibility is a new international treaty elaborating a set of procedural rules that 
govern the process of international treaty making, akin to the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, but elaborating rules that apply specifically to the rela-
tionship between states and non-state actors.  The treaty could address all 
  
252. In that instance one important sticking point was the debate over whether to adopt civil law or 
common law oriented default rules.  The debate implicated issues of state sovereignty and national 
pride, and seemed intractable, threatening to derail the proceedings.  The evidence suggests that 
business actors were instrumental in resolving the situation by serving as neutral third party referees.  
See supra Part II.A. 
253. For instance, in the Cape Town example, business actors proposed both the international registry 
and the innovative type of framework convention and protocol form.  See supra Part II.A. 
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would-be participants in the treaty process, or it could confine its ambit to a certain 
subset of actors, such as businesses.254   
Short of a comprehensive new treaty, another possibility is a new UN ac-
creditation regime that explicitly includes business entities, and offers procedural 
rules to help gatekeepers weigh the distinct costs and benefits of business partic-
ipation.  Just as in the NGO context, this UN accreditation regime could serve 
as a blueprint for similar regimes within other international lawmaking bodies.  
Alternatively, the current UN accreditation regime could be overhauled and 
updated to take a more comprehensive approach to the current participants in 
the treatymaking system, including business actors. 
A less formal but potentially useful option would be an elaborated set of soft 
law guidelines, or best practices to guide decisionmakers and business entities.  
While nonbinding, such a guide could help coordinate conduct and, if successful, 
mature into customary international law.  A final option is a formal or informal 
international agreement that commits states to updating their domestic laws to 
include rules that govern international and transnational lobbying activity.  This 
approach would suffer from a number of limitations outlined in Part III.B., and 
may fail to capture some of the benefits business participation could offer, but 
could operate fruitfully in tandem with other approaches. 
Whether or not more law is needed, the inchoate nature of the current re-
gime demands scholarly attention in order to resolve the array of important 
questions this Part has identified.  If, as seems likely, adoption of a set of legal 
rules emerges as the best course of action, scholars and lawmakers face the rare 
opportunity to select a suitable form and regulate on a tabula rasa. 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this Article is to crack the lid on a Pandora’s box of issues re-
lating to underappreciated business roles in the international treaty making pro-
cess.  The problems in this arena flow from the lack of a legal structure to govern 
an increasingly complex relationship between state and non-state actors in treaty 
making.  The international system appears to be drifting toward lawmaking 
patterns that incorporate business input in increasingly significant ways.  At the 
same time, there is little knowledge about these patterns, and a lack of systematic 
analysis of the costs and benefits of business roles.  Moreover, the international 
treatymaking system operates in an ad hoc fashion when it comes to business 
  
254. A treaty or series of treaties regulating non-state actors in the lawmaking process could also 
potentially address armed groups, secessionists, or NGOs. 
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roles, with no legal structure—not even a set of standard operating procedures—
to define who participates or what process should facilitate and restrain business 
roles in lawmaking.  Thus, as this Article has argued, the ad hoc, unsystematic, 
unregulated international treatymaking system presents both potential danger 
and a great opportunity. 
The danger is that business entities will obstruct, delegitimize, or weaken 
lawmaking that is meant to protect important global public goods.  Conversely, 
the international community may fail to take advantage of the significant benefits 
business can offer.  Or, international law may fail to respond at all and suffer from 
illegitimacy or dysfunctional obsolescence.  These dangers are real, and demand a 
legal response. 
The opportunity is equally significant.  Because the current legal regime is 
not broken, but rather nonexistent, lawmakers face a blank slate, which offers the 
potential for empirically sound, theoretically principled, prospective lawmaking.  
The question that remains is whether, and how, the international community 
will seize the fleeting chance to exploit it.  
